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ABSTRACT
There were two main objectives o f this study. The first objective was to 
develop a theoretical model that will explain auditor resignations. To meet this 
objective, a model was developed which was primarily grounded in prior research 
related to auditor resignations as well as prior research addressing auditor switching. 
The second objective was to estimate the model at four different quarterly dates 
immediately prior to an event date (i.e., the resignation date) so that the effects o f time 
on the explanatory power o f  the model and each independent variable could be 
ascertained. This objective was met by identifying and collecting data at each 
quarterly date for each variable in the model and by using logit regression to analyze 
the data (i.e., to estimate the model at each quarterly date prior to the event date). The 
sample o f  companies included both a resignation group o f  companies and a non­
resignation group o f companies.
Overall results from estimating the model suggest that the model was 
significant for each o f  the four quarterly time periods and that using information closer 
to the event date increased the model’s explanatory power. In regards to the specific 
independent variables, the results suggest that, for all quarterly time periods, firms are 
more likely to resign from (1) clients who are smaller in size; (2) clients who are in 
financial distress as modeled by a net loss; (3) engagements in which the tenure o f the 
auditor is low; and (4) clients who are in industries in which the auditor has an
iii
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increasing and/or a relatively high market share. Additionally, companies that had a 
greater likelihood o f  management misrepresentation were also associated with an 
increase in the likelihood o f a resignation; however, this association was sensitive to 
time. Specifically, this association was only significant in the two quarterly time 
periods immediately prior to the event date. Overall, these results suggest that CPA 
firms do respond to risk factors associated with the client and (such firms) are not 
solely fixated on monetary rewards.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The traditional contractual relationship between the independent audit firm 
(firm or auditor) and the client (company) begins when the company, via shareholder 
approval, engages the independent auditor to provide certain assurances with respect 
to certain financial statements o f the company. In turn, this relationship ends when 
either the company dismisses the auditor (dismissal) or when the auditor terminates 
the engagement (auditor-initiated switch) by resigning (resignation) or declining to 
stand for re-election (declination).
Research regarding dismissals, resignations and declinations is encompassed 
within the broader research domain o f auditor switching. To a large degree, prior 
research in this domain has focused on switching in general— not auditor-initiated 
switching. In regards to auditor-initiated switching, research to date has focused on 
resignations versus declinations presumably due to the greater frequency of 
resignations as opposed to declinations. Consistent with research to date regarding 
auditor-initiated switching, the focus o f  this study is on resignations.
1.1 Statement of the Problem
In regards to resignations, there are three issues that have not yet been 
addressed in the research to date. First, research has found that several variables are 
associated with resignations. These include, but are not limited to, changes in the
l
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financial distress o f  the client (Shu 2000), changes in the litigation risk borne by firms 
(Shu, 2000) and the tenure o f  the auditor (Menon and Williams, 1999). O f the 
variables found significant in prior research, certain variables (e.g., change in financial 
distress and auditor tenure) have yet to be evaluated concurrently in the same 
explanatory model. Second, certain variables that have been shown to be significantly 
different between switchers and non-switchers (e.g., auditor independence) have yet to 
be evaluated in an explanatory model o f resignations. Third, the effect o f  different 
measurement dates prior to a resignation (versus a single date) have yet to be 
evaluated. In order to gain additional insights regarding resignations, each o f the three 
issues addressed above were incorporated into the methodology employed in this 
study.
1.2 Objectives
There are two objectives o f this study:
1. To develop a theoretical model that will explain auditor resignations.
2. To estimate the model at several different quarterly dates immediately 
prior to an event date so that the effects o f  time on the explanatory 
power o f  the model and each independent variable can be ascertained.
1.3 Methodology
The structure o f  this section on methodology is as follows. In general, Section
1.3.1 comments on model development. Section 1.3.2 describes the sources used to 
collect data as well as the type o f  data collected. Section 1.3.3 describes, in general, 
how the data was analyzed in this study.
1.3.1 Model Development. Models employed in prior research have focused 
on different variables associated with the resignation decision. For example, Menon
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3and W illiams (1999) found that misrepresentations made by the client as well as the 
expertise and tenure o f  the auditor were important variables. In addition, Shu (2000) 
found that a client’s degree o f  financial distress as well as client’s associated with 
high-tech industries were also important. In addition to certain variables found 
significant in prior research, the model developed in this study also included additional 
variables theorized to be significant (i.e., not yet evaluated in the auditor resignation 
context). These variables were included as the independent variables in a logit model 
while the dependent variable was the resignation status (i.e., resignation or non­
resignation).
1.3.2 Data Collection. All publicly traded companies are required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to report various types o f  information 
(filings) to the SEC. Filings include Form 10-K (annual report), Form 10-Q (quarterly 
report), and Form 8-K (current report). Compact D/SEC is a source o f data that 
contains references to the SEC filings (filing reference) o f  all companies required to 
make such filings. Information about each filing reference includes the type o f form 
filed, the date o f  the filing, and possibly other information specific to a particular 
form. The filing reference for Form 8-K (8-K) is critical to this study in that it 
contains a numeric item number that is associated with the contents o f  the actual 8-K. 
The specific item number necessary for this study is item four because this item 
number indicates that disclosures in the 8-K are related to an auditor switch.
Based on filing references contained in the July, 1996 to January, 2001 
quarterly Compact D/SEC discs (i.e., information pertaining to the period June 19961
1 June 1996 is the first full month in which 8-Ks for all public companies were required to be filed 
electronically with the SEC and thus become part o f the publicly accessible Edgar database.
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4to December 2000), a resignation group o f  companies was identified as follows. First, 
a search for all filing references for all companies during the period June, 1996 to 
December, 2000 was performed. During this search process, all 8-K filing references 
that also had a reference to an auditor switch (i.e. item four) were extracted to form an 
auditor switching data set. Second, the filing date o f each filing reference in the 
auditor switching data set was used to locate the actual 8-K in Lexis-Nexis or Edgar. 
Upon examination o f  each 8-K, auditor switches that were resignations (verses 
dismissals or declinations) were selected to form the resignation group o f companies 
(i.e. resignation group).
Data for a control group was collected as follows. First, a group o f  non­
resignation companies was formed by eliminating from the population o f  companies 
contained in Compustat any company that was part o f  the resignation group. 
Additionally, the non-resignation group was reduced further by eliminating companies 
that did not report any total assets during the study period (i.e., total assets was used as 
an indicator that financial information about the company was available) and by 
eliminating all financial companies (i.e., companies with SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999). Second, a random sample o f  the non-resignation group o f companies that was 
approximately the same size as the resignation group was extracted to form the control 
group o f  companies (i.e. control group).
Information for companies in both the resignation and control group was 
obtained from Compustat, Compact D/SEC, or Lexis-Nexis. For the resignation 
group, the information consisted o f  the most recent data prior to the resignation date. 
Since the control group did not have a resignation date, a random date during the
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5period under study was selected for each company. Based on this random date, 
information consisting o f  the most recent data prior to the random date was used. 
Thus, the event date for the resignation group was the actual resignation date disclosed 
in the 8-K and the event date for the control group was a date chosen at random.
1.3.3 Data Analysis. Logit estimation is an empirical technique used to 
estimate models (i.e. logit models) that have a dichotomous dependant variable. Since 
this study has a dichotomous dependant variable (i.e. resignation vs. non-resignation), 
a logit model was developed and estimated. The results were used to explain the 
occurrence o f resignations and to evaluate the association between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. Initially, the model was estimated using data 
available on and before the last quarter-end date prior to the event date (i.e., the date o f  
the occurrence o f  the resignation, or for the control group, a random date). This 
estimation yielded information regarding the overall power o f  the model to explain 
resignations as well as information regarding the significance and explanatory power 
o f the variables used in the model. The model was then re-estimated based on data 
available on and before the penultimate (i.e., next-to-last) quarter-end date prior to the 
event date. This estimation (i.e., one based on data relative to the penultimate quarter- 
end date) also yielded information regarding the overall explanatory power o f the 
model as well as the significance and explanatory power o f  the variables used in the 
model. This process o f  re-estimating the model was repeated until the model had been 
estimated at four different points in time -  once for each o f the four quarter-end dates 
that immediately preceded the event date. The results o f  these estimations were used 
to evaluate hypotheses developed regarding each independent variable, to evaluate the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6overall explanatory power o f  the model, and to evaluate the explanatory power o f  each 
independent variable. The evaluation o f  the results o f the model was conducted both 
at each point in time (i.e., at each quarter-end date) as well as across time.
1.4 Differences from Other Research
This study differs from research to date in four manners. First, variables have 
typically been measured using annual data reported at the fiscal year-end (year-end) 
immediately preceding a resignation (i.e., the event date). As a consequence, the time 
interval between the date that each variable was measured to the event date could vary 
widely. For example, one company could report a resignation one month after the 
year-end while a resignation for another company could be reported nine months after 
the year-end. As a result, prior research has not minimized the effect that different 
time intervals have on the resignation decision. Consequently, the impact that 
different time intervals have on the results o f prior research is unknown. In contrast, 
this study utilized the most recent quarter-end data available prior to the event date to 
measure the variables (verses the most recent annual year-end data). This yielded 
more consistent and timelier information related to the resignation decision.
Second, prior research has used a single measurement date (i.e., the year-end 
immediately prior to the event date) for the independent variables used in estimating 
models regarding the resignation decision. While using one measurement date prior to 
the event date has been useful in identifying variables that are significant in the 
resignation decision, the effects o f different measurement dates prior to the event date 
on the significance o f  the variables is unknown. Therefore, this study estimated an 
explanatory model for several different measurement dates in order to determine the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7effects o f  time on both the explanatory power o f  the model as well as the explanatory 
power o f  the independent variables. Third, certain other independent variables used in 
the auditor switching literature, but not previously used in the resignation literature 
(e.g., auditor independence), were employed in this study. And finally, the 
measurement o f  certain independent variables (e.g., financial distress) differed from 
that used in prior research.
1.5 Conclusion
An overview o f  this study was provided in this chapter. The remainder o f this 
study is arranged as follows. First, a review o f  the literature relevant to this study is 
provided in Chapter 2. Second, a discussion o f the methodology used is provided in 
Chapter 3. Third, the results o f  the study will be presented in Chapter 4. Finally, a 
summary o f  findings and a discussion o f the limitations and implications for further 
research will be provided in Chapter 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CH A PTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior literature relevant to resignations can be classified into two general areas: 
laws and regulations (pertinent to clients and firms) and academic research. There are 
three sources o f laws and regulations that will be discussed: the SEC, the American 
Institute o f  Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Professional Standards, and 
Congress. Until relatively recently, academic research has primarily focused on 
auditor switching as opposed to resignations. Since resignations are a sub-group o f 
switchers, the research related to switching may provide information relevant to 
resignations. Each o f  the sources o f  rules and regulations as well as academic research 
related to switching and resignations are discussed in the following sections.
2.1 Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations
The Securities Exchange Act o f  1934 empowers the SEC to require companies 
with publicly traded securities to periodically report information to the SEC. In 
general, companies that have publicly traded securities must file annual and other 
periodic reports if  they meet the follow ing two criteria: ( I )  securities are held by more 
than 500 owners, (2) total assets are greater than $10 million (SEC 2001). The 8-K is 
one form that may be filed on a periodic basis.
The 8-K is required to be filed i f  any one or more o f  the events specified in 
Table 2.1 occurred (unless a substantial part o f  the information that would be
3
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9TABLE 2.1 
Events Reported in Form 8-Ka
Description of Event Maximum Time to File Report
Item I : Changes in Control of Registrant 
Item 2: Acquisition or Disposition o f Assets 
Item 3: Bankruptcy or Receivership 
Item 4: Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountant 
Item 5: Other Eventsb
Item 6: Resignation of Registrant's Directors
Item 7: Financial Statements and Exhibits0 
Item 8: Change in Fiscal Year
Item 9: Sales o f Equity Securities Pursuant to Regulation Sd
15 calendar days after event 
15 calendar days after event 
15 calendar days after event 
5 business days after event 
N/A
5 business days after receipt of 
resignation lener 
60 calendar days after event 
1S calendar days after date change is 
made 
N/A
1 The above table presents, in summary form, those events (Items) that are required to be disclosed in Form 8-K. 
A dditionally, the maximum am ount o f  time from the occurrence o f  the event to the filing o f  the 8-K is also 
presented. Source: Form 8-K Instructions. 
h Reporting other events is optional.
c Financial statements are only required in connection with an acquisition reported in Item 2.
Item 9 has been removed effective January 1, 1999.
contained in the 8-K has been previously reported in another form such as the 10-Q or 
10-K). Table 2.1 also details the maximum amount o f time that can lapse from the 
occurrence o f the event to the filing o f  the 8-K. In addition, companies may report 
multiple events in a single 8-K filing. As a result o f the 8-K filing requirements, 
information relevant to investors is disclosed in the 8-K in a timely manner.
Certain disclosures contained in the 8-K will be a significant source o f 
information that will be utilized in this study. Specifically, disclosures related to item 
four (auditor switching) will be used to determine the type o f auditor switch that 
occurred. The remaining disclosures provided in the 8-K (i.e., those pertaining to 
other item numbers) are not directly relevant to this study and, accordingly, will not be 
discussed.
Specific disclosure requirements pertaining to auditor switching (i.e., item 
four) are embodied in Item 304 o f  the SEC Regulation S-K. These requirements state 
that if  the relationship between the company and their auditor has ceased, then the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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information related to this change must be disclosed under item four o f  the 8-K. In 
general, the following must be disclosed with respects to the predecessor auditor. 
First, the company must state whether the predecessor auditor resigned, declined to 
stand for re-election or was dismissed. In addition, the date on which this occurred 
must be disclosed. Second, the type o f  opinion expressed by the predecessor auditor 
during the two preceding years must be reported. If the opinion expressed was not a 
standard opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion without modifications) then a description 
o f the specific reservations mentioned by the predecessor auditor must be disclosed. 
Third, the company must state whether the decision to change auditors was 
recommended by the audit committee or the board o f  directors if  the company has no 
audit committee. Fourth, any disagreement between the predecessor auditor and the 
company during the two most recent fiscal years must be disclosed. In general, 
disagreements are limited to those that pertain to accounting principles or practices, 
financial statement disclosure, or auditor scope or procedure issues regardless o f 
whether the disagreement was resolved. Fifth, other conditions o f the company must 
be disclosed as “reportable events” unless they have already been disclosed as a 
disagreement. These include, but are not limited to, a condition where the predecessor 
auditor acknowledged to the company that a lack o f  internal controls exists that 
prohibit the development o f reliable financial statements and a condition where the 
predecessor auditor acknowledged to the company that it was unwilling to rely on the 
representations o f management. Finally, the company is required to supply the 
predecessor auditor with a copy o f the completed 8-K on or before the day that it is 
filed with the SEC. The company must request that the predecessor auditor review the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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8-K disclosures and provide the company with a letter stating whether the predecessor 
auditor agrees or disagrees with the statements made therein. This letter from the 
predecessor auditor is also required to be filed by the company to the SEC within ten 
days from the initial filing o f  the 8-K.
In summary, the SEC requires disclosures o f specified events as they occur 
rather than requiring disclosures only on a quarterly or an annual basis. This increases 
the value o f the disclosed information to investors because it is timely. The 8-K is the 
form that is used to disclose information about certain changes (events) that occur 
within a company. The specific disclosures related to auditor switching will be a 
significant source o f information that will be used in this study.
2.2 Professional Standards
The AICPA Professional Standards identify certain instances in which it would 
be appropriate for an auditor to resign from an audit engagement. Specifically, 
guidance concerning auditor resignations can be found in the Statements on Auditing 
Standards, the Code o f Professional Conduct and the Statements on Quality Control. 
Admittedly, such guidance was not designed to be all-inclusive.
2.2.1 Statements on Auditing Standards. The Statements on Auditing 
Standards identify several instances when it would be appropriate for the auditor to 
resign from an audit engagement. First, if the auditor concludes that it is not 
practicable to modify audit procedures to sufficiently address the risk o f  material 
misstatement due to fraud, then the auditor should resign and communicate the reasons 
for the resignation to the audit committee or other corporate body with equivalent 
authority and responsibility (AICPA, §AU 316.26 and §AU 316.36, 1998). Second,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the auditor may discover during the performance o f  the audit that an illegal act 
occurred that has a material impact on the financial statements. As a result, the auditor 
should modify the audit opinion appropriately. If  the client refuses to accept the 
modified report, then the auditor should resign and communicate the reasons for the 
resignation to the audit committee or other corporate body (AICPA, §AU 317.20, 
1999). Third, if  an illegal act is discovered during the course o f  the audit and the 
client does not take corrective action that the auditor deems warranted under the 
circumstances, the auditor should resign even if the illegal act is not material to the 
financial statements (AICPA, §AU 317.22, 1999). Fourth, if non-audited information 
presented with the financial statements contains material inconsistencies with the 
financial statements, the auditor should evaluate this information to determine if the 
financial statements or the audit report should be revised. If the financial statements 
do not require revision, the auditor should request that the client revise the non-audited 
information. If the client does not make the necessary revisions to the non-audited 
information so that the material inconsistency is eliminated, then the auditor should 
consider remedial actions. Remedial actions include revising the audit report to 
include an explanatory paragraph that describes the material inconsistency, 
withholding the use o f  the audit report, and resigning from the engagement (AICPA, 
§AU 550.04, 1996).
2.2.2 Code o f  Professional Conduct. The Code o f  Professional Conduct also 
provides guidance related to two circumstances that would warrant the resignation o f 
an auditor. First, if  the auditor determines that he is not competent and is unable to 
gain sufficient competence to complete the audit engagement then the auditor should
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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resign from the engagement (AICPA, §ET 201.02, 1999). Second, if  the auditor 
believes that his independence has been impaired by actual or potential litigation (i.e., 
against the auditor by the client), the auditor should either resign, suspend the work on 
the audit engagement until the matter is resolved, or disclaim an opinion due to lack o f 
independence (AICPA, §ET 101.08, 1999).
2.2.3 Statements on Quality Control. The Statements on Quality Control 
require that firms establish and maintain a system that evaluates the decision to accept 
or continue an audit engagement. The system policies and procedures encompassed in 
making this decision should provide the firm with reasonable assurance that the 
integrity o f management is sufficiently high to warrant association with the client 
(AICPA, §QC 20.14, 2000). Implicit in this decision making process is the idea that if 
management lacks sufficient integrity, then the auditor should resign.
2.2.4 Summary. The AICPA has developed professional standards that its 
members should follow when providing services to clients. In regard to resignations, 
the Statements on Auditing Standards, the Code o f Professional Conduct, and the 
Statements on Quality Control contain guidance that an auditor should consider when 
evaluating a resignation decision.
2.3 Changes in the Legal Environment
The litigation risk associated with an audit engagement is significantly 
influenced by the nature o f  the legal environment. The laws that govern such 
litigation as well as their interpretation and use are an important component o f this 
risk. In recent years, new laws enacted by Congress have had an impact on litigation 
that alleges violations o f  securities laws. These new laws have impacted both the
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litigation risk bom  by auditors as well as auditor disclosure and resignation 
requirements.
2.3.1 Changes Affecting Litigation Risk. A significant law that was enacted to 
decrease the level o f  litigation risk associated with securities filed with the SEC is the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act o f  1995 (PSLRA). The primary motivation 
for this legislation was to reduce frivolous lawsuits that firms as well as other parties 
(e.g., officers, directors, the company itself) faced. Prior to the enactment o f  the 
PSLRA, firms involved in shareholder suits were liable jointly and severally, thus a 
firm involved in such a suit could be forced to pay the full amount o f  damages 
awarded to the plaintiff regardless o f  the degree o f  fault that resided with the firm or 
other defendants. As a result, firms with perceived “deep pockets” were subject to 
numerous frivolous suits. Even though most firms that went to trial would eventually 
pay either a small amount in damages or none at all, many firms responded to these 
meritless suits by seeking a settlement rather than going to trial because, regardless o f 
the merits o f the case, the costs associated with defending a suit were significant 
(Palmrose 1994). With the enactment o f  the PSLRA. joint and several liability was 
replaced, in most cases, with proportionate liability if  the firm has no knowledge that 
security laws have been violated (violations). Under proportionate liability, firms that 
act “recklessly” (undefined in the law) but without knowledge o f  violations are subject 
to judgments that reflect their proportionate responsibility in the suit. However, firms 
remain joint and severally liable if it can be shown that they knew o f violations that 
would materially impact the financial statements, but they did not take the appropriate
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action to disclose them (e.g., communications with the audit committee, board o f  
directors, management, or the SEC).
Other provisions o f  the PSLRA were also designed to decrease litigation risk. 
In general, the safe harbor provision provides litigation protection for firms that allow 
forward-looking statements to be included in the financial statements as long as these 
statements are clearly identified. O ther provisions include limiting attorney’s fees to a 
“reasonable” amount, prohibiting the use o f  the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act in civil cases involving securities fraud, increasing the amount o f  
proof required by a plaintiff, and eliminating certain abusive practices involving fees 
paid to plaintiffs. Given all the provisions in the PSLRA, the risk o f litigation 
associated with issuing an audit opinion should decline; however, this is based on the 
assumption that the law cannot be circumvented in some fashion.
For example, upon the passage o f the PSLRA, lawyers began to evade this law 
by bringing a number o f  class action lawsuits in state courts, which the act did not 
cover (Gitenstein & Rothfeld 2001). In order to counter this action by lawyers, 
Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act o f 1998 (SLUSA). 
The intent o f  this legislation was to “prevent certain State private securities class 
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objective o f  the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act o f  1995” (Administrative Procedure Act 1998). 
Upon the passage o f this act, this “state loophole” in the PSLRA was closed.
Admittedly, other loopholes may exist. Thus, the extent to which firms 
perceive a reduction in their litigation risk as a result o f these new laws is contingent 
upon the ability o f  lawyers to bypass the intent o f  these laws as well as how these laws
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are interpreted by a judge/jury in court cases. Some o f the main objectives o f  these 
new laws appear to have been successful: frivolous cases are being dismissed, 
settlements o f meritless cases appear to be diminishing, and the settlement value of 
cases with real merit is increasing (Gitenstein & Rothfeld 2001). However, King & 
Schwartz (1997) note that the determination o f  liable parties as well as the 
apportionment o f  fault is determined by a judge/jury. In this regard, the PSLRA gives 
two factors that should guide a judge/jury in allocating responsibility: the nature o f the 
conduct that contributes to the loss, and the nature and extent o f  the causal relationship 
between the conduct and damages. In spite o f  these guidelines, the ultimate decision 
lies with the judge/jury who may yet look to the “deep pockets” o f the firm when 
making their decisions. Given that the SLUSA has only been enacted recently, the 
true impact o f  this law may not be observable at present. Therefore, firms may still 
pay a greater amount in damages than their “ fair share.”
2.3.2 Changes Affecting Disclosure and Resignation Requirements. The 
PSLRA provided legislation directed towards auditors as well as other parties. In 
addressing auditors, the PSLRA does place a disclosure burden on auditors in the form 
o f a “whistleblower” provision. Under this provision, if  the auditor discovers the 
possibility that an illegal act (act) occurred, regardless o f  potential materiality, the 
auditor is required to further assess the likelihood that the act occurred and the 
possible effects on the financial statements. If the act is deemed material, then the 
auditor is required to communicate this information to management and the audit 
committee (or board o f  directors i f  there is no audit committee). If after making this 
communication, the auditor concludes that ( 1 ) the act continues to have a material
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effect on the financial statements, (2 ) senior management has not taken actions that are 
both appropriate and timely, and that (3) this failure o f management to address the 
problem would result in a departure from a standard report or a resignation, the auditor 
should report these conclusions directly to the board o f directors, which should then 
immediately notify the SEC. If within one day after this communication to the board 
o f directors the auditor does not receive information that indicates that the board has 
submitted the firm’s conclusions regarding the act to the SEC, the auditor is then 
required to report its conclusions directly to the SEC or resign (and report the 
conclusions to the SEC). If the auditor complies with these requirements, then they 
will not be held liable in any private action for information contained in the 
conclusions reported to the SEC.
2.3.3 Summary. With the enactment o f  the PSLRA and the SLUSA, the 
litigation risk faced by firms should be reduced. This reduction is primarily due to the 
replacement o f the joint and several liability method o f  awarding damages to a 
proportionate liability method. These laws also have direct effects on the disclosures 
made by firms as well as guidance on when a firm should consider resigning from an 
engagement.
2.4 Academic Literature -  Switching
There are many studies in prior research that have investigated auditor 
switching. Some studies have examined the audit opinion and switching (Chow and 
Rice 1982, Krishnan 1994, Krishnan and Stephens 1995, Krishnan et al. 1996) as well 
as switching and the pricing o f audit engagements (DeAngelo 1981, Simon and 
Francis 1988, Gregory and Collier 1996, W alker and Casterella 2000). Other research
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has sought to uncover variables associated with switching (DeFond 1992, DeFond and 
Subramanyam 1998) and to determine what impact that switching has on stock returns 
(Fried and Schiff 1981, Smith and Nichols 1982, Nichols and Smith 1983, Johnson 
and Lys 1990, Carter and Soo 1999).
Prior research on switching (resignations being a part o f  switching) may reveal 
variables that may be associated with resignations. Specifically, variables that were 
significant in studies that examined switchers and a control group o f  non-switchers 
prior to the switching event may also be significant when examining resignations and 
a control group that did not resign. Additionally, research related to the market 
response o f switches may provide additional information relevant to this study.
2.4.1 Switchers vs. Non-Switchers. A review o f  switching studies was 
performed to determine which variables have been consistently different between 
switchers and non-switchers. Based on this review, six studies were found that 
investigated various aspects o f  these two groups (i.e., switchers and non-switchers) 
before the actual switching event (Chow and Rice 1982, W illiams 1988, Haskins and 
Williams 1990, Krishnan 1994, Krishnan et al. 1996, DeFond and Subramanyam 
1998). Table 2.2 provides a summary o f the findings o f  these studies. Overall, the 
audit opinion has received the most attention and has been shown to be a variable that, 
in most studies, distinguishes switchers and non-switchers. Net income, financial 
distress, client size, residual standard deviation from the standard market model, time 
listed on stock exchange, client beta, audit firm industry dominance, and a Big Six 
(now Big Five) classification have also been shown to be important variables in two or 
three studies. Since the variables previously mentioned have been significantly
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TABLE 2.2
Studies Examining Switchers and Non-Switchers Prior to Switch3
Study
Chow and Haskins and DeFond and
Rice Williams Williams Krishnan Krishnan et al. Subramanyam
1982 1988 1990 1994b 1996 1998
Sample Years 1973-1974 1977-1982 1985 1986-1987 1986-1988 1990-1993
Sample Size:c
Switchers 418 (8)d 186 149 197 116 503*
Non-switchers 9,042 (158)d 186 3,320 2,792 1,762 f
Variables:
Financial
Audit opinion1* + * 
Net income
0 *
*
+
* *
Financial distress a A *
Size it * -
Growth a 0
Sales / assets *
Accruals / assets *
Cash flows / assets *
Market related
Residual standard deviation * *
Time * ♦
Beta ♦ *
Firm related
Firm dominance * it 0
Big Six
Auditor tenure *
♦ -
Other
Change in management * 
Client negative publicity *
Accruals/assets: (Net income before extraordinary items -  operating cash flows) / total assets.
Audit opinion-. CR and W88 -  1 if modified, 0 otherwise; HW -  1 if unqualified, 2 if "subject to," 3 if nonconsistancy “except for," 4 if 
disclaimer; K94 and K96 - 1 if unqualified, 2 if asset realization or litigation uncertainties, 3 if going concern.
Auditor tenure: Data was coded based on five year increments that predecessor auditor served client (i.e., 0, 5, 10, 15, 20).
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TABLE 2.2 continued
Beta: K94 and K96 -  slope coefficient of the standard market model regression.
Big six: K94 and K96 -  1 if a big six auditor, 0 otherwise. Pre-merger firms are included with post-merger firms.
Cash flows/assets: Operating cash flows / total assets.
Change in management: I if client changed president, chief executive officer, chief financial officer or treasurer during the two years prior to 
switch.
Client negative publicity: 1 if client accused of fraud, financial statement error, foreign bribe, or for issuing misleading financial information; 
0 otherwise.
Financial distress: HW and K96 -  Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; DS -  Altman’s (1968) Z-score.
Finn dominance: W88 -  firm’s industry market share based on sales and four-digit standard industrial classification code, HW and K96 -  
same as W88 except results are generally based on a two-digit standard industrial classification code.
Growth: HW -  percentage change in sales; K96 -  1 if client falls in the top quartile of growth rate of assets, 0 otherwise.
Net income: K94 and K96 -  1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise; DS -  net income before extraordinary items.
Residual standard deviation: K94 and K96 -  residual standard deviation from a standard market model regression.
Sales/assets: Net sales / total assets.
Size: H W -  net sales; K94 and K96 -  natural logarithm o f the book value of total assets deflated by the implicit price deflator for GNP.
Time: K94 and K96 -  1 if the company has been listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ for more than five years; 0 otherwise.___________
‘ Throughout this table the following abbreviations will be used: CR refers to Chow and Rice (1982), W88 refers to Williams (1988), HW refers to Haskins and Williams 
(1990), K94 refers to Krishnan (1994), K9(> refers to Krishnan (199b), and DS refers to DeFond and Subramanyam (1998)
b 'Hie same data were also reported in Krishnan and Stephens (1995), therefore, that study is not presented in this table
‘ Sample size without parenthesis in CK is large because it is based on a Chi-squared test for independence of classification. This test is based on counts of observations; 
therefore, lack of financial and market data does not cause observations to be excluded DS doesn’t include market variables, which caused fewer observations to be excluded. 
K94 and K9(> include market variables, which cause a reduction in the sample si/e as compared to DS. Differences between K94 and K9b sample sizes arc due to K9(> drawing 
their sample from the September 1998 Disclosure Inc. disc while K94 drawing his sample from the March 1988 to March 1990 Disclosure Inc. discs. Data in W88 and HW arc 
limited to intra-Hig eight switches only; however, W88 is also limited to clients that trade only on the NYSli or AMl-X while HW does not impose this restriction.
d The amounts in parenthesis denote a sub-sample of a larger sample denoted without parenthesis Analysis on the larger sample was conducted using a Chi-square test for 
independence and analysis on the sub-sample was conducted using logistic regression.
c Due to data limitations, sample data for switcher's /-score was between 400 and 437 instead of 503
1 Actual number not reported.
* Prior to SAS No. 58, auditor’s issued 'qualified’ opinions when material uncertainties were present, whereas, after auditor's issued an unqualified opinion with modifications 
(i.e., modified opinion). The current terminology will he used in this table unless otherwise noted
0 Variable was insignificant in univariate and multivariate analysis or unimportant in the recursive partitioning algorithm modeling technique.
1 Variable was significant at the .01 or 05 level in a multivariate analysis and univariate analysis The sign of the coefficient in the multivariate analysis is given.
* Variable was significant al the .01 or 05 level in a univariate analysis.
tt HW use a recursive partitioning algorithm modeling technique that doesn't base it’s results on conventional significance levels Variables that were found to be most 
important arc included
* Variable significant in univariate analysis but insignificant in multivariate analysis.___________________________________________________________________________
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different between switchers and a control group o f  non-switchers, they may also be 
significantly different between resignations and a control group that did not experience 
a resignation. W hile the analysis in Table 2.2 was designed to illuminate variables 
that have been significant in several studies regarding switchers and non-switchers, 
variables that were significant in only one study may provide additional insights 
regarding resignations as well.
2.4.2 M arket Reaction. The market reaction related to the date information is 
thought to be released about switches (i.e., release date) has been examined in the 
literature. Several studies have found that there is no market response when the 
release date is the 8 -K filing date (Johnson and Lys 1990, Schwartz and Soo 1996, 
Carter and Soo 1999). However, Fried and Schiff (1981) found a negative market 
response, but subsequent tests in their study that were designed to determine the 
underlying motives to the negative response were not fruitful. In summarizing their 
results, Fried and Schiff questioned the information content o f  the disclosure 
requirements in spite o f the negative market reaction found. Other studies have used 
the event date in the 8 -K disclosures (i.e., the actual date that the auditor change took 
place) to test market responses. Schwartz and Soo (1996) study market responses to 
switches based on the event date during the period 1988 to 1993 and find no 
significant market response. In contrast, Carter and Soo (1999) study the market 
response to switches during 1993 and find a significant negative market response. 
Given Carter and Soo’s (1999) limited study period, their findings may not be 
generalizable to other periods.
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In contrast to studies that have focused on the market response at a release 
date, other studies have examined the market reaction based on the disclosure or lack 
o f disclosure o f  disagreements between the client and auditor. Fried and Schiff (1981) 
found no market response related to the disclosure o f  disagreements. However, Smith 
and Nichols (1982) comment that the sample size used by Fried and Schiff was too 
small and may have biased their results. In other studies, Smith and Nichols (1982) 
find a negative market reaction to the disclosure o f  disagreements and Dhaliwal et al. 
(1993) find that switches disclosing disagreements have a significantly lower market 
reaction than switches that do not disclose any disagreements. Carter and Soo (1999) 
suggest that both disagreements as well as resignations convey negative information to 
the market. Therefore, part o f the negative market response found in prior research on 
switching and disagreements may be related to resignations.
2.4.3 Summary. With respect to switching, prior research related to 
differences between switchers and non-switchers could provide insights to variables 
that may be associated with resignations since resignations are a sub-group o f 
switchers. Based on a review o f  six studies, the audit opinion, net income, financial 
distress, client size, residual standard deviation from the standard market model, time 
listed on a stock exchange, client beta, audit firm dominance and Big Six classification 
have been shown to distinguish switchers from non-switchers. In addition, most 
research has not found a market reaction related to switching when the switch is 
disclosed; however, negative market reactions have been found related to the 
disclosure o f  disagreements.
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2.5 Academic Literature - Resignations
W hile most o f  the prior research regarding auditor changes has focused on 
auditor switching, several studies related to resignations have been written in recent 
years. The general areas that these studies have addressed can be categorized as 
follows: differences between resignations and dismissals, determinants o f resignations, 
and market reactions to resignations.
2.5.1 Differences Between Resignations and Dismissals. The SEC requires 
that companies delineate between resignations, declinations and dismissals in their 8 - 
K disclosures (FRR No. 31). This delineation implies that the information content 
related to these types o f  auditor changes is different and meaningful to investors. 
DeFond et al. (1997) provide evidence that resignations differ from dismissals. 
Specifically, DeFond et al. (1997) find that resignations are associated with more 
auditor-client disagreements and greater declines in company cash flows than 
dismissals. In contrast, Scholz (1996) finds that there were no distinguishing 
characteristics between the two groups in the computer industry. Krishnan and 
Krishnan (1997) find that resignations are associated with more reportable events 
and/or disagreements disclosed in the 8 -K and that resignations are associated with 
more clients that are in a greater degree o f  financial distress than dismissals. In 
addition, resignations as opposed to dismissals are more likely to be associated with 
clients that have been issued a modified opinion, less likely to have an auditor with a 
long tenure, and are less likely to occur as the proportion o f  revenues generated by the 
client to the total revenues o f  the firm increases. Raghunandan and Rama (1999) find 
that Big Six (now Big Five) firms are less likely to serve as a successor auditor when
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the predecessor auditor had resigned rather than being dismissed. Shu (2000) finds 
that resignations are associated with a greater change in litigation risk, a greater 
likelihood o f  a client being mismatched with their auditor (e.g., a client who should be 
audited by a larger firm but the incumbent firm is small), and a greater likelihood of 
being associated with clients in high technology (high-tech) industries as defined by 
the client’s standard industrial classification (SIC) code.
2.5.2 Determinants o f  Resignations. Schroeder and Verreault (1987) conducted 
an experimental study that was designed to determine the following: the variables that 
influence resignations, the relative weight o f each variable, and whether decision­
makers (i.e., partners) in different sized firms weighed the variables differently. Their 
results suggest that disagreements over fees, audit scope restrictions, management 
integrity, disagreements over the application o f  GAAP, and disagreements over the 
audit report or opinion were the main variables that would lead a partner to consider 
resigning from an audit engagement. Additionally, their results suggest that partners 
o f  both large and medium sized firms were consistent on ranking management 
integrity and scope restrictions as the most important variables while partners o f  small 
firms ranked scope limitations and disagreements over the audit opinion as the most 
important. Thus, partners in different sized firms do weight the variables differently 
(i.e., partners in different sized firms differ as to what would lead a partner to consider 
resigning from an audit engagement). Overall, management integrity and scope 
restrictions were deemed the most influential variables.
Scholz (1996) finds that the most important variables associated with 
resignations in the computer industry were the existence o f modified audit opinions,
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the existence o f  litigation either against the auditor or the client in general, and the 
reliability o f  management. Scholz also concludes that market related information is 
not widely used by auditors in evaluating clients. This conclusion is based on a 
review o f client continuance programs as well as conversations with audit partners. 
Sholz states that “auditors argue that measures o f  past volatility, which aggregate 
market information across several years, are not useful in predicting precisely which 
clients will eventually suffer the type o f price decline that will trigger an auditor 
lawsuit.” This conclusion is consistent with the results o f Schroeder and Verreault 
(1987) in that none o f  the variables that the partners identified as important relied on 
measures o f  stock market volatility. In addition, Pratt and Stice (1994) find very little 
support to the argument that auditor’s use the volatility o f a client’s common stock 
when assessing litigation risk.
Menon and W illiams (1999) find that firm-initiated auditor changes 
(resignations and declinations) can be partially explained by audit error cost. This cost 
is the product o f  the auditor’s assessment o f the likelihood o f client misrepresentation 
(CM) and the expected losses to the firm that may result from the CM being 
subsequently disclosed. In Menon and Williams (1999), resignations and declinations 
are modeled separately. In regards to resignations, the study finds that CM, low levels 
o f firm expertise in the client’s industry and a shorter auditor tenure are likely to 
increase audit error costs and increase the likelihood o f a resignation. In regards to 
declinations, Menon and Williams (1999) find that the results are similar to that o f 
resignations except that the level o f  expertise and auditor tenure are insignificant. 
Finally, another analysis is performed to determine the characteristics that differentiate
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resignations and declinations. The findings provide some evidence that firms are more 
likely to resign, rather than decline renewal, when the tenure is shorter and the clients 
are smaller.
Shu (2000) extends the literature by proposing and examining two competing 
hypothesis regarding resignations. First, Shu proposes the litigation risk hypothesis, 
which states that incumbent auditors are more likely to resign when they are exposed 
to increased litigation risks. In order to test this hypothesis, Shu develops a litigation 
prediction model and applies this model to data associated with a sample o f  clients 
whose firm had resigned and another sample o f non-switchers. The result was a 
composite measure o f the litigation risk faced by the auditor for each client. Other 
studies have developed litigation prediction models that could have been used to 
calculate a composite measure. Table 2.3 provides a summary o f  the variables that 
prior research has shown to be significant in several litigation prediction models 
including the model developed by Shu. In a subsequent analysis using the composite 
measure, Shu finds that increases in the composite measure o f  litigation risk were 
associated with a greater probability o f  a resignation; however, the direct effects that 
each variable has, if any, on a resignation is unknown.
Second, Shu proposes the clientele-adjustment hypothesis, which states that 
firms are more likely to resign when intra-firm decisions to modify the criteria used to 
establish and maintain their client-portfolio result in a client becoming “mismatched” 
with their auditor. In tum, Shu develops and implements a methodology to isolate the 
mismatch condition. The results suggest that the mismatch condition is associated 
with a higher probability o f  a resignation. Additionally, Shu finds that increases in a
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TABLE 2.3 
Summary of Litigation Risk Variables3
Carcello and Lys and
Stice Palmrose Watts Shu
Litigation Risk Variablesc 1991d 1991 1994 2000
Financial Variables:
Accrual/assets -
Financial condition' - 0 -
Financial leverage +
Inventory/assets 0/+ +
Net income +
Probability o f acqusition +
Receivables/assets 0 *t-
Return on assets
Sales growth +/0 +
Size 4- + -r
Market Variables:
Delist status -r-
Stock return 0 -
Stock turnover -
Stock variability + 0
Other Client Variables:
Financial irregularity -r
Independencef -/o -r
Opinion 0 0 -t-
High-tech industry +
Tenure -/O
Accruals/assets: accruals to total assets.
Delist status: 1 if client was delisted fromCRSP due to financial difficulties in Year -<-1; 0 otherwise. 
Financial condition: S91 -  Altman’s Z score (Altman 1968).
CP -  (i) Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index for non-financial companies. Sinkey et ai.’s 
(1987) financial condition index for banks and (ii) 1 for net income and 0 for net loss.
LW -  Ohlson's (1980) bankruptcy prediction model.
Financial irregtdarity: 1 if a SEC enforcement action exists against the client or its officers or 
directors involving material omissions or misstatements in financial statements and disclosures 
prior to bankruptcy: 0 otherwise.
Financial leverage: total liabilities / total assets.
Independence: LW -  ratio o f client's sales to total sales o f all clients o f  the auditor.
S91 -  calculated as [1 -  (ratio of client’s sales to total sales o f all clients o f the auditor)]. 
Inventory/assets: S91 -  inventory / total assets.
SOO -  inventory I lagged assets.
Opinion: S91 -  (i) I if the opinion on the financial statement before the earliest o f bankruptcy or 
onset of litigation was modified, 0 otherwise and (ii) 1 if the opinion on the last two financial 
statements before bankruptcy were modified, 0 otherwise.
CP. LW & SOO -  I if client received a non-standard audit opinion; 0 otherwise.
Net income: 1 if net income, 0 otherwise.
Probability o f  acqusition: Palepu’s (1986) model.
Receivables/assets: S 9 1 -  net receivables / total assets.
SOO -  net receivables I  lagged assets.
Sales growth : SOO and S91 -  rate o f change in sales from Year -1  to Year.
Size: CP, LW and SOO -  natural logarithm o f total assets.
S91 -  natural logarithm o f  a clients market value.
Stock return: L W -  stock return over Year -1 .
SOO -  stock return over Year.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
TABLE 2.3 continued
Stock turnover, the proportion o f shares that were traded at least once over Year.
Stock variability: S91 -  the variance o f abnormal returns.
SOO -  standard deviation o f  daily stock returns.
High-tech industry: 1 if client’s standard industrial classification code is in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 
8730s, or between 3825 and 3839; 0 otherwise.
Tenure: 1 if audit tenure is more than three years, 0 otherwise.___________________________________
* Throughout portions of this table the following abbreviations will be used to note the source of the litigation factor' SOI 
refers to Stice (1091), CP refers to Carcello and Palmrose (1994), LW refers to Lys and Watts (1994), and SOO refers to Shu 
(2000). In addition, only those variables that were significant in a multivariate analysis in at least one of the studies are 
presented.
6 The sign listed gives the nature of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable; zero indicates that the 
variable was insignificant.
c Litigation variables are given a brief description in this table if the factors are not self-explanatory. Additionally, the point in 
time when the variables are measured relative to the date of litigation against the auditor is not consistent for each study, 
therefore. "Year" will be used as a general reference point when needed. For more details regarding specitic calculations, 
refer to the appropriate study
J A sign or zero to the left of the forward slash (i.e., '*/”) represent results of the litigation model when a control sample that 
was matched on the year that the litigation took place was used. A sign or zero on the right of the forward slash represents 
results using a control sample on industry and year.
'  Lower values generated by the Altman (1968) Z-score used by S91 represent a poorer financial condition. Higher values of 
the Ohlson (1980) model used by LW represent a poorer financial condition. LW reports an unexpected negative association 
between financial condition and auditor litigation: however, LW do perform additional analyses and find that increases in the 
probability of bankruptcy from the Ohlson (1980) model are associated with increases in auditor litigation.
'  LW reports a positive relationship while S91 reports a negative relationship. This is due to LW calculating the importance 
of the client to the firm (importance ratio) and S9I using a measure of auditor independence [1 - importance ratio |.________
client’s financial distress as well as client’s associated with high-tech industries also 
increase the likelihood o f  a resignation.
Table 2.4 summarizes the results o f  multivariate models used in the resignation 
studies reviewed in this section except for Schroeder and Verreault (1987) who did not 
perform a multivariate analysis and Scholz (1996) whose study was limited only to the 
computer industry. Each study has used resignations as the dependent variable and a 
control group that consists o f  non-switchers or a random set o f  clients whose auditor 
had not resigned. The results o f  these studies are summarized below.
First, the results show that the integrity o f management, as modeled by client 
misrepresentation (CM), is an important variable such that increases in CM increase 
the likelihood o f  a resignation. The interaction terms o f  CM and investment loss an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
TABLE 2.4
Summary of Determinants of Firm-Initiated Auditor Changes
Study*
Menon and Williams 1999 Shu 2000
Dependent Variable Resignation (1) 
Non-switchers (0) 
217(2,168) 
1990-1996
Resignation (1) 
Random (0)b 
269 (645)d 
1985-1996
Sample Size0 
Years
Independent Variables:
Client misrepresentation (CM)
CM * Investment loss
CM * Stock turnover
Firm market share
Size
Tenure
Change in financial distress 
Change in litigation risk 
Change in mismatch status 
High-tech industry__________
Change in financial distress : Financial distress is based on a bankruptcy model mentioned only in the 
footnotes of the study; however, the author reports that the results are similar to other probability of 
bankruptcy models such as Zmijewski (1984). Change in this measure is based on the difference 
between Year -3  to Year -1 where Year refers to the year that the resignation occurred.
Change in litigation risk: Litigation risk is a composite measure calculated using a litigation 
prediction model developed in the study. Change in litigation risk is based on the difference 
between Year -3  to Year -1 where Year refers to the year that the resignation occurred.
Change in mismatch status: 1 if the client and auditor have become mismatched between Year -3  and 
Year -1 where Year refers to the year that the resignation occurred, 0 otherwise. The mismatch 
status in a given year is based on the results o f a auditor size (i.e., large or small) prediction model 
developed in the study. For example, if the model predicts that a client should be paired with a 
large auditor in Year -3  and a small auditor in Year -1 while the client has continued to engage a 
large auditor, then a change in the mismatch status is deemed to have occurred.
Client misrepresentation (CM): 1 if any one of the following were detected prior to the date o f the 
resignation: accounting errors/irregularities or debt covenant violations during the prior 12 months, 
free-cash-flow deficiencies, or a high percentage o f insiders on the board o f  directors; 0 otherwise.
CM * Investment loss: This variable is an interaction term between the existence o f client 
misrepresentations and losses incurred by investors. Losses are calculated by first determining the 
maximum price o f the client’s common stock over the six-month period ending nine months prior 
to the date of the firm-initiated change. Investors losses are calculated based on the return from this 
maximum-price date to the date o f the firm-initiated change.
CM  • Stock turnover: This variable is an interaction term between the existence o f client 
misrepresentations and the turnover o f the client’s stock over a 250-day period preceding the date 
o f the firm-initiated change.
Firm market share: The percentage o f  total sales in an industry audited by a firm.
Size: Natural logarithm o f total assets.
Tenure: The number o f years that the predecessor auditor had been engaged to the client before the
firm-initiated change. This variable was capped at nine years.
High-tech industry: 1 if client’s three digit standard industrial classification code is 283, 357, 737, 
873, or between the four digit standard industrial classification codes 3825 and 3839; 0 otherwise.
* To be included in this table, a study must have measured all o f the independent variables before the firm-initiated auditor 
change date and used a control sample of non-switchers or clients whose auditors did not resign. Additionally, any sample 
could not be limited to any one industry or group of related industries.
b Shu (2000) runs two separate logistic regressions. One uses resignations as the focus group and a random control group 
while the other models resignations against other client-initiated changes. The results from the analysis using the random 
sample are presented. This sample is described as a random sample of clients whose auditor did not resign.
c Numbers outside the parenthesis represent the number of resignations or declinations while those inside represent the
number of control observations (i.e., non-switchers or random).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
TABLE 2.4 continued
d Total observations of 914 were given in Table 5 of the study, but a breakdown between resignations and random samples 
was not delineated. However, the resignation sample was stated to be 269 in the text prior to Table 5; therefore, the random 
sample was calculated to be 645. 
t  Sign of coefficient of a variable that was significant at the .01 or .05 level.____________________________________________
stock turnover are also significant. However, the use of market volatility data in the 
resignation decision is questionable (see section 2.5.2).
Second, a firm’s market share in an industry and a firm’s tenure are also 
important variables. A firm’s market share in an industry is theorized to be closely 
related to the level o f  industry expertise o f  the firm. Consequently, given a high level 
o f  industry expertise, firm’s can use this expertise to lower their overall audit risk 
through specialized audit procedures developed for a client. In a similar fashion, the 
greater the tenure o f  the firm, the greater the client expertise. As a result o f  increases 
in industry and/or client expertise, the overall level o f audit risk is reduced. Therefore, 
as the level o f  expertise increases, the likelihood that an auditor will resign decreases. 
The sign o f  the market share variable (i.e., firm expertise) supports this conclusion.
Third, the size o f the client is another important variable. The variable used to 
control for the size o f the client is significant and negative, which indicates that 
resignations are more likely to occur with small clients rather than large ones.
Fourth, the change in a client’s financial distress, the change in a client’s 
mismatch status and clients associated with high-tech industries are also important 
variables. Results show that the greater the financial distress (i.e., probability o f 
bankruptcy) o f  the client the greater the likelihood that a firm will resign. In addition, 
changes in the client’s mismatch status as well as clients associated with high-tech 
industries increase the likelihood o f a resignation.
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Finally, increases in the composite measure o f  litigation risk increase the 
likelihood that a resignation will occur. While the variables used to calculate litigation 
risk are associated with actual litigation against auditors, the direct effect that these 
variable have upon resignations is not known.
2.5.3 Stock Market Reactions. Defond et al. (1997) analyze excess returns 
(i.e., stock market returns for a company less an overall market return for the same 
period) for a sample o f  resignations and dismissals that occurred during the period 
1982 to 1987. For each resignation or dismissal that occurred during these years, the 
excess returns were computed over three time periods: pre-filing period (from the date 
o f  the auditor change to the date o f the 8 -K filing), post-filing period (from the 8 -K 
filing date plus five business days), and a combined period (pre-filing period plus 
post-filing period). Based on these excess returns, the results o f  this study suggest that 
the excess returns associated with resignations were significantly less than zero for all 
three time periods, while the excess returns associated with dismissals were 
significantly less than zero only during the post-filing period. In addition, the excess 
returns for resignations and dismissals were found to be indistinguishable in the post­
filing period. Thus, the results o f this study suggest that the market only views 
resignations as bad news in the pre-filing period indicating that there may be a 
“ leakage” o f information regarding a resignation prior to the filing o f  the 8 -K. Also, 
during the post-filing period the market makes no distinction between resignations and 
dismissals and views them both as negative information.
Wells and Loudder (1997) analyze the abnormal returns (i.e., actual returns 
less expected returns) associated with a sample o f resignations that occurred during
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the period 1988 to 1991. The expected returns were based on a 190-day estimation 
period that ended ten days before the 8 -K filing date. Expected returns were then 
calculated for the two-day period that began on the day that the disclosure o f  the 
resignation was made public via the filing o f the 8 -K. Results o f  this study suggest 
that companies do experience significant negative returns during this two-day period 
when a company discloses that the incumbent auditors have resigned. An additional 
test was performed to determine if other variables (i.e., the size o f the company, the 
disclosure o f  non-resignation information in the 8 -K, and the disclosure o f  a specific 
reason for the resignation in the S-K) caused the negative returns rather than just the 
disclosure o f  the resignation. Results o f this additional test show that the other 
variables had no impact on the negative returns. Furthermore, the results suggest that 
the disclosure o f  the resignation caused the negative returns.
Shu (2000) also finds a negative market reaction during a three-day window 
around the filing date o f  the resignation. In addition, Shu (2000) suggests that 
increases in litigation risk are associated with a larger decrease in stock price, 
provided that the resignation occurs during the annual audit.
2.5.4 Summary. Prior research has shown that resignations differ from 
dismissals, and that variables such as the change in a composite measure o f litigation 
risk and the change in the level o f financial distress are associated with an increase in 
the likelihood that a firm will resign. Given that some o f  the variables used to 
determine the composite measure o f litigation risk have not been modeled against 
resignations directly, modeling such variables along with other variables that have 
been shown to influence a resignation may provide additional variables significant in a
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firm’s decision to resign. Finally, resignations have been shown to have a negative 
impact on a company’s stock price.
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CHAPTER III
Methodology
The structure o f  this chapter on methodology is as follows. Section 3.1 
presents the development o f  the model. Section 3.2 describes the process o f  data 
collection that was employed. Section 3.3 presents the data analysis technique that 
was used to test the hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents the time-varying aspect o f  the 
methodology. Section 3.5 presents a summary o f this chapter.
3.1 Model Development
Logit estimation is an empirical technique used to estimate models that have a 
dichotomous dependant variable. This technique has been used in prior research to 
estimate resignation models (Menon and Williams 1999, Shu 2000). Similarly, this 
technique was used in this study to gain increased insights regarding the variables that 
distinguish companies whose auditor resigns as opposed to companies whose auditor 
does not resign (i.e., a dichotomous dependent variable). The results were used to 
determine the statistical relationship between the independent variables (measured at 
time t) and the dependent variable. The remainder o f  this section focuses on the 
development o f  each variable. Specifically, each variable will be developed as 
follows: general overview, findings o f prior research, statement o f  hypothesis, and 
measurement specifications.
34
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3.1.1 High Technology Industry (TECH). The industry in which a client 
operates could, in itself, be an indicator o f  an increase in risk that an auditor faces. 
Specifically, clients in high technology related (high-tech) industries have undergone 
significant growth and change in prior years. In addition, the level o f  competition 
among industry participants has increased significantly. As a result, clients are under 
pressure to meet earnings expectations. Consequently, the tendency for managers to 
issue misleading financial statements may be greater than in other industries. Auditors 
should be keenly aware o f these pressures and may adjust audit procedures to 
compensate for this increase in audit risk. Therefore, as auditors evaluate the increase 
in audit risk associated with clients in a high-tech industry, some may consider the risk 
to be too great and may, in turn, resign from the audit engagement.
Prior research has found that high-tech industries are generally associated with 
a higher number o f  occurrences o f fraudulent financial reporting (Loebbecke et al. 
1989) and a higher level o f  auditor litigation risk (Bonner et al. 1998, Shu 2000). In 
addition, Shu (2000) finds that clients in high-tech industries increase the likelihood 
that an auditor will resign. These findings support the theory previously presented and 
lead to the following hypothesis:
Hi: Clients operating in high technology industries are positively related to the 
probability o f  an auditor resignation.
An indicator variable was used to denote i f  a client is in a high-tech industry. 
Following Shu (2000), a client’s primary SIC will be used to determine whether the 
client operates in a high-tech industry. Specifically, the indicator variable was set to 
one if  client’s SIC code was in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, or between 3825- 
3839; zero otherwise.
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3.1.2 Financial Distress (FDB. FPL. FDIY An increase in the financial 
distress o f  a company is believed to increase the likelihood that managers will 
manipulate financial statement information in an effort to shield themselves from 
negative reactions from external parties (e.g., investors and creditors) as well as to 
fulfill a m anager’s inherent self-interest (e.g., increased compensation where 
compensation is based on financial statement information). As a result, the likelihood 
that financial statement manipulation will go undetected increases and, in turn, the 
likelihood o f  the firm attesting to misleading financial statements increases. 
Consequently, this can lead to lawsuits against the auditor. Stated another way, an 
increase in the financial distress o f a company is likely to be positively associated with 
a firm’s risk o f  litigation. As a result, the auditor is likely to consider this increased 
risk when evaluating the decision to continue or resign from the audit engagement.
In prior research, the financial distress o f a company has been proxied by the 
presence o f  a net loss (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984, Carcello and Palmrose 1994, 
Krishnan 1994, Krishnan et al. 1996) and by the probability o f  bankruptcy (Haskins 
and Williams 1990, Stice 1991, Lys and Watts 1994, Krishnan et al 1996, DeFond and 
Subramanyan 1998, Shu 2000). Some o f the results from these studies suggest that 
the presence o f  a net loss is a distinguishing characteristic between switchers and non­
switchers (Krishnan 1994, Krishnan et al 1996) and it is positively related to litigation 
against auditors (Carcello and Palmrose 1994). In addition, St. Pierre and Anderson 
(1984) find that a net loss that followed periods o f  net income increased the likelihood 
o f  litigation against the auditor. O ther results o f  these studies show the probability o f 
bankruptcy to be a distinguishing characteristic between switchers and non-switchers
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(Haskins and Williams 1990, Krishnan et al 1996, DeFond and Subramanyan 1998). 
In addition, results suggest that the probability o f  bankruptcy is positively related to 
resignations (Shu 2000) and to litigation against auditors (Stice 1991). In contrast, 
Lys and Watts (1994) report an unexpected negative relationship between the 
probability o f  bankruptcy and an auditor’s litigation risk. However, in subsequent 
analyses the authors do find a positive relationship. Other results also show that when 
both the presence o f a net loss and the probability o f  bankruptcy were modeled 
together in a multivariate analysis regarding litigation against auditors, the presence o f 
a net loss was shown to be positively related to litigation against auditors while the 
probability o f  bankruptcy was insignificant (Carcello and Palmrose 1994).
In summary, the results o f  prior research suggest that the presence o f  a net loss 
and the probability o f  bankruptcy are characteristics that distinguish switchers from 
non-switchers. In addition, results suggest that the presence o f  a net loss and the 
probability o f  bankruptcy are positively related to an auditor’s litigation risk if  these 
two variables are not included in a model simultaneously. When both variables are 
included in a model, results suggest that the presence o f  a net loss is positively related 
to litigation against auditors while the probability o f  bankruptcy is not significant. 
Further, results suggest that the probability o f  bankruptcy is positively related to 
resignations. Based upon prior research, this study theorizes that both measures o f  
financial distress are positively related to resignations.
This study employed both the probability o f bankruptcy as well as the presence 
o f  a net loss as indicators o f  financial distress. First, in general, the probability o f  
bankruptcy was used to create a more comprehensive measure o f  financial distress
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than measures used in prior research (FDB). Second, in general, the presence o f a net 
loss was also used as an indicator o f  financial distress (FDL). Furthermore, the 
presence o f a net loss that followed periods o f  net income was used to measure a 
“surprise” factor associated with financial distress (FDI)- The use o f  a “surprise” 
factor based on the presence o f a net loss also differs from prior research. Therefore, 
the following three relationships are hypothesized:
Hi: An increase in the financial distress associated with the probability o f 
bankruptcy is positively related to the probability o f  an auditor 
resignation.
H3 : An increase in the financial distress associated with the presence o f a net 
loss is positively related to the probability o f  an auditor resignation.
H4 : An increase in the financial distress associated with the presence o f a net 
loss following periods o f net income is positively related to the probability 
o f an auditor resignation.
The remainder o f  this section provides the specific details regarding the calculation o f
both measures o f  financial distress.
In regards to using the probability o f  bankruptcy to proxy for a company’s 
financial distress, Zm ijewski’s (1984) bankruptcy model was used. Bamber et al. 
(1993) note that this bankruptcy model, as opposed to others, is more useful because 
the coefficients o f  the model were given in the study, it yields a standard normal 
variable than can be converted into the probability o f  bankruptcy rather than yielding a 
dichotomous classification, it was constructed based on a broad range o f  industries and 
types o f  companies, and it is parsimonious (i.e., uses only a few variables to obtain a 
large explanatory power). This bankruptcy model has also been shown to yield 
similar results when compared to other bankruptcy models that were estimated with
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data in recent years (Shu 2000). Therefore, the financial distress associated with a 
client's probability o f  bankruptcy was calculated as follows:
FDB = CFD * IFD
where:
CFD = - ^ ~
PB<,
and
PB,
IFD =
IPB,
The composition o f the financial distress measure associated with the 
probability o f  bankruptcy (FDB) incorporates a change in a client’s probability o f 
bankruptcy between two points in time (CFD) along with the relative disparity 
between the client’s probability o f bankruptcy and the average probability o f 
bankruptcy in the client’s industry (IFD). In deriving the financial distress measure, 
let t represent a quarter-end date. Therefore, CFD is the ratio o f the client’s 
probability o f  bankruptcy at time t (PB, ) to the probability o f  bankruptcy that existed
two years prior to PBt [PBt ). Thus, values o f CFD larger (smaller) than one
represent an increase (decrease) in the probability o f  bankruptcy. IFD is the ratio o f 
the client’s probability o f bankruptcy at time t to the average probability o f  bankruptcy 
at time t for all companies in the client’s industry (IPBt). Thus, larger (smaller) values 
o f IFD represent an increase (decrease) in the probability o f  bankruptcy o f the client 
over the average probability o f bankruptcy o f  a company in the client’s industry. 
Therefore, by taking the product o f the change in the client’s probability o f bankruptcy 
(CFD) and the client’s probability o f  bankruptcy as compared to the industry average
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(IFD), larger (smaller) values o f FDB correspond to an increase (decrease) in the 
financial distress o f  a client and, in tum , a greater (lesser) likelihood o f a resignation.
FDB is a client-specific measure that is believed to impact a firm’s decision to 
resign. However, a client’s probability o f bankruptcy is not included as a separate 
component (i.e., it is not a separate component along with CDF and IDF). If firm’s 
use the probability o f  bankruptcy as a separate component in the resignation decision, 
it is assumed that they would compare this measure to some predetermined firm 
threshold that would apply to all o f  their clients (e.g., all clients with a probability o f 
bankruptcy greater than .70). Thus, financially distressed clients beyond some firm 
threshold would be subject to a resignation. While financially distressed clients that 
are subject to this “threshold” criterion may be dispersed among various industries, it 
is more likely that many o f these clients are concentrated in industries that have 
experienced a significant economic downturn. As a result, firms that use this 
“threshold” criterion would, in general, be transitioning out o f  an industry. Firm 
movements o f  this nature, generally referred to a mismatch, are discussed later in 
section 3.1.6.
In regards to a net loss, other dimensions o f  financial distress may include the 
simple presence o f  a net loss and/or the presence o f a net loss that is preceded by 
periods o f  net income. In regards to the simple presence o f  a net loss, prior research 
has shown that the presence o f a net loss was significant in switching studies (see 
section 2.4.1). As a result, the presence o f  a net loss prior to the event date will be 
included in this study. Specifically, an indicator variable (FDL) will be set to one if a 
company experienced a  annual net loss at time t where the annual net loss is defined as
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the sum o f  each quarterly net income amount immediately prior to and including time 
t. If the previous condition is not met, the indicator variable will be set to zero. In 
regards to the presence o f  a net loss that is preceded by periods o f  net income, prior 
research has found that when an unexpected net loss occurs after years o f net income, 
the risk o f  litigation against the auditor increases (see the prior research part o f this 
section). Thus, this “surprise” factor may also be associated with an increase in 
auditor resignations. Specifically, an indicator variable (FDI) will be set to one if an 
annual net loss was observed at time t and if  this loss immediately followed two years 
o f annual net income for the periods M  and t-2 where t-\ represents a time one year 
prior to t. The indicator variable will be set to zero if the preceding condition is not 
met.
3.1.3 Auditor Tenure (TEN). The tenure o f  an auditor is theorized to be 
inversely related to auditor changes because during the early part o f an auditor’s 
tenure the auditor is seeking to develop client-specific expertise so that efficiencies in 
information gathering and evaluation can lead to an improved service that benefits the 
auditor, the client, and the public. However, during this client-expertise development 
period, the auditor faces a higher risk o f audit failure because there is an increased risk 
that errors and/or irregularities will go undetected due to the unfamiliarity with the 
client. In fact, research has shown that in instances where material misstatements 
were detected, approximately 45% were detected during the first three years o f  the 
tenure o f  the auditor (Loebbecke et al. 1989). St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) also 
note that firm’s face a greater amount o f  litigation risk in the first three years o f  an 
audit engagement. Therefore, given a higher risk o f  audit failure during the early part
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of their tenure, the auditor, in turn, also faces a greater risk o f  litigation. As a result, 
the auditor must evaluate both the risk o f audit failure and the corresponding litigation 
risk during the early part o f the auditor-client relationship. If the auditor concludes 
that these risks are too great, the firm may resign.
Prior research has supported the theorized association between auditor changes 
and auditor tenure. Specifically, auditor tenure has been inversely related to auditor 
changes (Williams 1988) as well as firm-initiated auditor changes (Menon and 
Williams 1999). Thus a change in auditor is more likely to occur during the first part 
o f  an auditor’s tenure. Therefore, this leads to the following hypothesis:
H5 : The tenure o f the auditor is negatively related to the probability o f  an 
auditor resignation.
To operationalize auditor tenure, a variable will be constructed that will 
contain the number o f  years that the incumbent auditor has been retained by the client.
3.1.4 Auditor Independence (INDEPT The independence o f  the auditor is a 
core element in the process o f attesting to a client’s financial statements. In this 
regard, an important issue is at what point does the client’s importance to the firm 
impair the firm’s independence (Goldwasser 2001). A client could become important 
to a firm if the audit fees paid by the client represent a significant portion o f the total 
revenue o f  the firm (Stice 1991). Therefore, an important client could exert influence 
on the auditor to attest to financial statements that the auditor knows are misleading. 
Thus, the mere size o f  the audit fees relative to the firm’s total revenue could give the 
client enough influence that could impair the auditor’s independence.
A measure o f  auditor independence for a client could be generated by dividing 
a client’s audit fees by the total audit fees earned by a firm during a given period.
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Thus, low values would indicate that a firm was not dependent on the fees o f  the client 
and the firm could be considered independent. However, audit fee data has not been 
reasonably attainable. As a result, research has developed an alternative measure o f  
auditor independence that is based on using a client's revenues as a surrogate for audit 
fees (Stice 1991, Krishnan and Krishnan 1997). Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) 
examine a sample o f  resignations and dismissals and found that the independence o f  
the auditor was a significant variable in that differentiated resignations from 
dismissals. Stice (1991) examines lawsuits against auditors and finds that when a 
year-matched control sample is used, auditor independence is significant and inversely 
related to the likelihood o f the auditor being sued. Thus, a higher level o f  auditor 
independence is associated with a lower level litigation risk. However, when an 
industry-year matched control sample is used, the independence o f  the auditor 
becomes insignificant. Stice concludes that industry characteristics play a role in 
determining variables associated with litigation against auditors. To control for 
certain industry effects, this study includes an indicator variable that is set to one if a 
client is in a high-tech industry, which has been shown to be associated with a higher 
degree o f  litigation risk (see section 3.1.1).
In regards to auditor independence and resignations, it follows that auditors 
with a low (high) level o f  independence would have a lower (higher) propensity to 
initiate a resignation. By contrast, extending the findings in Stice (1991) to 
resignations, one would conclude that an high (low) level o f  auditor independence 
would result in a low (high) level o f  resignations because o f lower (higher) litigation 
risk. However, it is not reasonable to conclude that more resignations would occur
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given that firms are more dependent on a client’s audit fee (i.e., less independent).
Therefore, a positive association between auditor independence and resignations is
theorized to exist, which leads to the following hypothesis:
H6: The independence o f the auditor is positively related to the probability o f 
an auditor resignation.
Both Stice (1991) and Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) compute the level o f
auditor independence based on the following formula which will be used in this study:
CR„
i n d ,  = i — r - 2-
S « .
/  = l
where:
i = 1,2,...,! for all firms
j = 1,2 , . . . , J for all clients
rND,j = the level o f  auditor independence between client j and firm i 
CRtJ = revenues o f  client j audited by firm i
Several limitations regarding this formula are noted by Krishnan and Krishnan
(1997). First, the formula assumes that audit fees are a determining factor in the level
o f  auditor independence and that a client’s total revenues are a surrogate for audit fees.
Second, a better measure for the denominator would be the total profits derived by the
firm. Finally, when this formula has been employed in research the total revenues
from all clients in the denominator has not included revenues from non-public clients.
In regards to the first limitation, the use o f  a client’s total revenues may not be
as great a limitation as mentioned in Krishnan and Krishnan (1997). A client’s total
revenue may be a better indicator o f  total fees paid by the client (audit and non-audit)
rather than audit fees alone. As a result, total fees may have a greater correlation to
auditor independence than audit fees alone.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
3.1.5 Company Size (SIZE). The size o f  the client has implications in regards 
to ( 1 ) the size o f  judgm ents or settlements (awards) associated with a lawsuit, (2 ) the 
likelihood o f  audit failure and (3) the importance o f  the client to the auditor. First, the 
larger the client the larger the potential awards associated with a lawsuit, and, 
accordingly, the larger the litigation risk. As a result o f  increases in litigation risk, the 
likelihood o f  an auditor resignation is also theorized to increase. Second, larger clients 
have more complex organizational and information infrastructures that make the audit 
process more complex and more prone to audit failure. Consequently, more complex 
clients are theorized to be associated with an increase in resignations. Third, the fees 
paid by a large client may represent a significant portion o f  the firm’s revenues. As a 
result, the firm may be reluctant to resign in spite o f  concerns over litigation risk or 
concerns over increased audit risk associated with a more complex client. Thus, the 
overall theorized effect o f  the size o f the client and resignations is not clear.
Prior research finds that an increase in the size o f  the client is associated with 
an increased level o f  litigation against a firm (Stice 1991, Lys and Watts 1994, 
Carcello and Palmrose 1994, Shu 2000). While Shu (2000) finds a positive 
association between client size and auditor litigation, the study also notes that the 
mean client size associated with resignations was significantly lower than a control 
group. A similar finding is present in Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) who state that 
auditor’s may be “more reluctant to resign from large clients than small ones (without 
regard to litigation risk).” In fact, in a study o f  resignations and non-switchers, Menon 
and Williams (1999) find that the size o f  the client is negatively related to 
resignations. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
H7 : The size o f  the client is negatively related to the probability o f  an auditor 
resignation.
To model the effect o f client size, a variable containing the natural logarithm 
o f the client’s total assets was used.
3.1.6 Client-Firm Mismatch (M ISM ). The auditing industry has undergone 
many changes. These include, but are not limited to, changes in technology and an 
increase in non-audit services. The impact o f  these two changes on firms has been 
amplified due to an increase in the level o f  competition for audits and the inability o f 
firms to generate more revenues from audit engagements. As a result, many firm’s 
production functions have become more cost efficient and a greater number o f firms 
have devoted more resources towards the development o f  non-audit services. 
Consequently, firms have modified their desired portfolio o f  clients. This change in 
the portfolio o f  clients has resulted in firms increasing their market share in industries 
that are matched with their core competencies and reducing their market share in 
others that are not. Thus, as a firm transitions out o f  an industry, a client may become 
associated with a firm that maintains a low involvement in the client’s industry (i.e., 
the client’s industry has over time become outside the core competency o f  the firm). 
Thus, another firm may better serve the client, and hence, the client-firm alignment 
has become mismatched. While a mismatched client may eventually dismiss the firm 
that performs their audit, it is also possible that a firm will decide to resign.
With respect to client mismatch, no prior research known to the author exists 
expect for Shu (2000). In this regard, Shu (2000) extends prior research by 
developing a methodology to determine if  a client is mismatched with its current firm 
(mismatch status), and whether a change in the client’s mismatch status is associated
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with a resignation. While Shu finds a significant positive association between the 
change in mismatch status and resignations, the methodology developed to determine 
the mismatch status is only designed to predict mismatches that occur between large 
and small firms. Mismatches that occur between the same size firms are not 
considered. In other words, a client mismatched with a large firm that may be better 
aligned with another large firm is not considered. This omission is important because 
Shu also reports that 46% o f  the resignation sample represented changes between large 
firms and 20% were between small firms. Therefore, given that 6 6 % o f the auditor 
changes that occurred in the resignation sample were within the same firm size 
category, a significant number o f mismatches may not have been detected. To 
compensate for this limitation as well as to identify mismatches in general, this study 
employs the use o f  an alternative methodology based on a firm’s market share in an 
industry.
The alternative methodology is based on prior research that has examined the 
issue o f  firm market share concentration in client industries (firm concentration). 
Eichenseher and Danos (1981) find evidence o f firm concentration in specific 
industries, but in a smaller subset o f  industries they find that the firm concentration 
had not changed significantly during the period 1964 to 1975. Danos and Eichenseher 
(1982) find that the firm concentration o f  larger firms tended to deteriorate over the 
period 1972 to 1979 in nonregulated industries; whereas this deterioration did not take 
place in industries that were regulated. In a later study, Kwon (1996) finds evidence 
that industries dominated by relatively few companies (high company concentration) 
will exhibit a lower level o f firm concentration than those industries that have a larger
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number o f  companies that operate in them. Kwon concludes that this situation arises 
because companies in a high company concentrated industry will be concerned about 
the leakage o f  proprietary information. Therefore, they would not want to engage a 
firm who also audits one o f  their competitors. As a result, Kwon concluded that a 
higher company concentration in an industry reduces the likelihood o f  a high firm 
concentration. While the results in Kwon (1996) were based on a cross-sectional 
study using data in 1989, Hogan and Jeter (1999) performed a longitudinal study and 
find that industries that have a higher company concentration were associated with 
higher levels o f  firm concentration. In addition, they find that firm concentration 
levels increased during the period 1976 to 1993 in both regulated and nonregulated 
industries. Furthermore, firms that were classified as having a high firm concentration 
in an industry increased their market shares over time while those firms with a will 
low firm concentration in an industry found that their market shares had declined.
In general, the changes in firm concentration result from intra-firm decisions 
that are influenced by the market for accounting services. As these changes occur, the 
firm adjusts its portfolio o f clients so that its clients would benefit from the firms 
existing or developing core competencies and the firm would benefit through 
increased profits and other non-financial benefits (e.g., enhanced reputation). 
Consequently, as firms reallocate resources over time to facilitate these decisions, 
some existing companies will become associated with a firm that has a low market 
share in the client’s industry, or, in other words, the client and firm are mismatched. 
Given a mismatch, a client is more likely to experience a change in auditor (i.e., a 
resignation or dismissal). This does not imply that all mismatches will result in a
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change in auditor. If the client-firm relationship is still mutually beneficial, then the
engagement is likely to continue. However, if  the beneficial nature o f  the relationship
changes, then a change in auditor is likely to occur.
To determine the association between the mismatch status and resignations, the
following hypothesis is proposed.
Hg: The degree that client-firm alignments are mismatched is positively 
related to the probability o f an auditor resignation.
The development o f  this hypothesis is designed to detect mismatches where a
firm resigns as a result o f  the decision to reallocate resources to a different mix o f
clients because the benefits associated with the new clients are greater. The
calculation o f  the variable used to proxy for this hypothesis was based on the
following firm market share formula provided in Hogan and Jeter (1999):
MSit=  "
ijk 
1=1 j - \
where:
i = 1 , 2 ......1 for all firms
j = 1,2,...,J  for all clients
k = 1 ,2 , . . . ,K. for all industries
Ik = the number o f firms in industry k
Jik = the number o f  clients served by firm i in industry k
Ajjk= total assets o f  client j in industry k by firm i
The degree o f  mismatch that exists between a client and firm was calculated as
follows:
M ISM  = ----------------
R M S* IMS
where:
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The composition o f  the degree o f  mismatch (MISM) incorporates a  change in 
the market share o f  the client’s audit firm between two points in time (RM S) along 
with the relative disparity o f  the firm’s market share as compared to that o f  the firm 
with the dominant market share (IMS). In deriving the mismatch measure, let t 
represent a quarter-end date and let T  represent the most recent fiscal year-end prior to 
t. Therefore, RMS is the ratio o f  the market share o f  the client’s audit firm at the most 
recent fiscal year-end prior to t (MSikr) to the market share o f  the client’s audit firm
that existed on the fiscal year-end two years prior to M Sikr {MSikr ). Thus, values o f
RMS smaller (larger) than one represent a decrease (increase) in market share. IMS is 
the ratio o f  the market share o f  the client’s audit firm to the highest market share o f  an 
audit firm in the client’s industry both measured at time T  (HMS ikr). Thus, smaller
(larger) values o f  IMS indicate that there is a larger (smaller) disparity between the 
market share o f  the client’s audit firm and the dominant firm in the industry. Given 
that firms with smaller market shares, relative to other firms in an industry, will 
encounter declines over time in their already low market shares (Hogan and Jeter 
1999), a smaller IMS would increase the likelihood that the client and firm were 
mismatched. Therefore, by taking the inverse o f the product o f  RMS and IMS, high
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(low) values o f  MISM represent a higher (lower) degree o f  mismatch that exists 
between the client and firm.
3.1.7 Management Misrepresentation (MR). W ithin the AICPA Professional 
Standards, the Statements on Auditing Standards as well as the Statements on Quality 
Control address issues where an auditor should resign if  the integrity o f  management 
is considered too low to warrant association with a client (see sections 2 .2 . 1  and 
2.2.3). Although not specifically mentioned in the professional standards, four factors 
that might be an indicator o f low management integrity that might lead to fraudulent 
financial reporting are a prior disclosure o f irregularities, a deficiency in cash-flow, a 
prior disclosure o f debt covenant violations, and a high percentage o f  officers on the 
board o f directors (M enon and Williams 1999). Additionally, disclosed errors that 
cause the financial statements to be materially misleading may indicate a lack o f 
sufficient internal controls or a lack o f  enforcing existing internal controls. In either 
case, disclosed errors are indicative o f a weak system o f  internal controls that increase 
the likelihood o f audit failure. Given the presence o f one or more o f  these factors, an 
auditor may be more inclined to resign from an audit engagement.
Prior research regarding the factors previously mentioned has shown that they 
are associated with a significant positive relationship with resignations (Menon and 
Williams 1999). Specifically, Menon and Williams (1999) combine these factors into 
a single measure (an indicator variable) when testing the effects on resignations (see 
table 4). This leads to the following proposed hypothesis:
H9 : Clients whose management is considered to have a higher likelihood o f 
issuing misleading financial statements are positively related to the 
probability o f  an auditor resignation.
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Following M enon and Williams (1999), an indicator variable will be
constructed to indicate that the management o f  the client has a higher likelihood o f
issuing misleading financial statements. Specifically, this variable will be set to one if
any o f  the following four conditions are met. First, if  errors or irregularities were
disclosed during the twelve months prior to t. Second, if  debt covenant violations
were disclosed during the twelve months prior to t. Third, if  the client is experiencing
free-cash-flow deficiencies as defined by the following formula:
O C F - A C E ,  ,0,
FREEC = ------ -----------
In the formula above, OCFt represents the operating cash flows for the four quarters 
prior to and including t. ACE, jIof ( represents average capital expenditures for the
three year period ending one year prior to t (i.e., ACE, ). CA, represents current
assets one year prior to t. FREEC represents a continuous measure o f ffee-cash flows. 
The indicator variable was set to one if the value o f  FREEC is less than -.5. Fourth, if 
the percentage o f  officers on the board o f  directors is greater than 67%. If any o f the 
above four conditions are not met, then the indicator variable will be set to zero.
3.1.8 Legislation (LEG98). The litigation risk associated with an audit 
engagement is significantly influenced by the nature o f  the legal environment. The 
laws that govern such litigation as well as their interpretation and use are an important 
component o f  this risk. With the enactment o f  the PSLRA in December, 1995 and the 
SLUSA in November, 1998, the litigation risk faced by firms should be reduced. This 
reduction is primarily due to the replacement o f  the jo int and several liability method 
o f awarding damages to a proportionate liability method (see section 2.3).
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Prior research supports the theorized reduction o f  litigation risk faced by firms. 
Gitenstein and Rothfeld (2001) find that frivolous cases are being dismissed and 
settlements o f  meritless cases appear to be diminishing. Geiger and Raghunandan 
(2 0 0 1 ) find that in an analysis o f bankrupt companies, auditors were less likely to 
issue a going-concem modification in an audit report after the passage o f the PSLRA 
in 1995 than before. However, the effects o f  the SLUSA, if  any, have not been 
investigated in any prior research known to this author. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed with respect to resignations:
Hio: The passage o f the SLUSA o f 1998 reduced an auditor’s litigation risk 
and is negatively related to the probability o f  an auditor resignation.
To model the effect o f  the passage o f the SLUSA, an indicator variable will be 
set to one for years subsequent to the passage o f the legislation and zero otherwise.
3.1.9 Firm Size (BIG5). In maintaining a portfolio o f  clients, firms generally 
develop a set o f  client continuance criteria that will aid the firm in meeting their 
overall objectives (e.g., profitability, portfolio risk level, and industry market share). 
During or at the conclusion o f the client continuance evaluation process, firms may 
decide to resign from some engagements. However, the continuance criteria may be 
different for Big 5 firms as opposed to non-Big 5 firms. Specifically, Big 5 firms may 
be in a better position to be more selective in establishing and maintaining their 
continuance criteria because o f the greater number o f clients in their portfolio o f 
clients. As a result, Big 5 firms may be more likely to resign than non-Big 5 firms . 2 
In turn, the following hypothesis is provided.
2 Prior research has found that there is a negative relationship between the size o f a firm (i.e.. Big 5 
versus non-Big 5) and the occurrence o f an auditor switch (Krishnan et al. 1996). Specifically, clients 
of Big 5 firms are less likely to switch than those o f non-Big 5 firms. However, three factors need to be
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H u '. The size o f the firm (i.e., Big 5) that audits a company is positively related 
to the probability o f  a resignation.
To operationalize this hypothesis, an indicator variable will be constructed that
will be set to one if  the company is audited by a Big 5 firm and zero otherwise.
3.1.10 Summary. The following logit model includes all the variables previous
discussed in this section.
RESIGN = b0  + biTECH + b: FDB + b3FDL + b4FDI + b5TEN + b6INDEP 
+ b7SIZE + b8MISM + b9M R + bi0LEG98 + b n BIG5 + e
where,
RESIGN = 1 for clients whose auditors resigned; 0 otherwise;
TECH = I if the client is in a high-tech industry defined as those industries that have
three digit SIC codes beginning with 283, 357, 737 and 873 plus those 
industries in the SIC code range 3825-3839; 0 otherwise;
FDB = a composite measure o f  financial distress associated with the probability o f
bankruptcy;
FDL = 1 if  the sum o f each four quarterly net income amounts immediately prior
to and including time i is less than zero; 0  otherwise;
FDl = 1 if the sum o f each four quarterly net income amounts immediately prior
to and including time t is less than zero and this net loss immediately 
follows two years that reported net income; 0  otherwise;
TEN = the number o f years that the client has engaged the incumbent auditor;
INDEP = [I - (client’s sales/total sales o f  all clients o f the auditor)];
SIZE = the natural logarithm o f total assets;
MISM = a composite measure o f  the degree o f client-firm mismatch;
MR = a composite measure denoting the likelihood o f misrepresentation by the
client;
LEG98 = 1 if  the year is after 1998; 0 otherwise.
BIG5 = 1 if  the company is audited by a Big 5 firm; 0 otherwise.
considered when seeking to gain insights into resignations based on the results o f  this study. First, the 
study did not distinguish between dismissals, declinations and resignations. Second, there are different 
decision makers based on the type o f switch. Specifically, the decision maker for a dismissal is the 
client while the decision maker for a resignation or a declination is a firm. Third, dismissals occur more 
frequently than resignations and declination combined; therefore, the results o f  the switch study may be 
biased towards dismissals. Therefore, the effect that the size o f firm has on the probability o f a 
resignation is not known and may not necessarily conflict with prior research findings.
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3.2 Data Collection
All publicly traded companies are required by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to report various types o f information (filings) to the SEC. Filings 
include Form 10-K (annual report), Form 10-Q (quarterly report), and Form 8 -K 
(current report). Compact D/SEC is a source o f  data that contains references to the 
SEC filings (filing reference) o f  all companies required to make such filings. 
Information about each filing reference includes the type o f  form, the date o f the 
filing, and possibly other information specific to a particular form. The filing 
reference for Form 8 -K (8 -K) is critical to this study in that it contains a numeric item 
number that is associated with the contents o f  the actual 8 -K. The specific item 
number necessary for this study is item four because this item number indicates that 
information in the 8 -K is related to an auditor switch and that disclosures related a 
switch have been filed with the SEC.
Based on filing information contained in the July, 1996 to January, 2001 
quarterly Compact D/SEC discs (i.e., information pertaining to the period June 1996 to 
December 2000), a resignation group o f  companies was identified as follows. First, a 
search for all filing references for all companies during the period June, 1996 to 
December, 2000 was performed. During this search process, all 8 -K filing references 
that also had a reference to auditor switching (i.e. item four) were extracted to form an 
auditor switching data set. Second, the filing date o f  each filing reference in the 
auditor switching data set was used to locate the actual 8 -K in Lexis-Nexis. Upon 
examination o f each 8 -K item four, auditor switches that are resignations (verses 
dismissals or declinations) were selected.
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Third, based on further examination o f the 8 -K for each resignation previously 
selected, the following five criteria was used to determine which resignations were 
excluded from further analysis. First, firm related issues disclosed in the 8 -K as the 
reason for the resignation were excluded. These include firm changes (e.g., mergers, 
splits or dissolutions), firm service issues (e.g., no longer serving public clients, no 
longer providing audit services or the death o f  partner) and firm independence issues 
(e.g., unpaid fees or significant business relationship with client). Second, 
resignations that the 8 -K describes as a mutual agreement between the client and firm 
were excluded because the underlying decision maker in these cases is not clear. 
Third, resignations that were the result o f  a company merger, a change in company 
location or an audit o f a subsidiary o f  the client were excluded. Fourth, financial 
companies (i.e., SIC codes 6000 to 6999) were excluded because the determinants o f 
the client-firm alignment may be different than in other industries due to various 
regulations imposed on clients (Shu 2000). Fifth, additional exclusions include 
resignations in which the date o f the resignation was not specifically mentioned or 
there were multiple resignations for the same client that occurred less than two years 
apart. After applying the five exclusion criteria previously mentioned, the remaining 
resignations comprise the resignation group that was used in subsequent statistical 
analyses.
A control group was formed based on the following steps. First, a group o f 
non-resignation companies was formed by eliminating from Compustat any company 
that was part o f  the resignation group. Second, based on the number o f  companies in
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the resignation group, an equal number o f the non-resignation companies was selected 
at random to form the control group.
Additionally, a random event date was calculated for each company in the 
control group as follows. First, the number o f  days during the sample period (i.e., 
June 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000) was calculated as 1,675. Second, a random 
number between 0 and 1,674 was chosen for each company. Third, the random 
number was added to the beginning date o f the study period (i.e., June 1, 1996) to 
form a random date for each company.
Financial information for companies in both the resignation and control group 
was obtained from Compustat, Compact D/SEC and Lexis/Nexis. Companies that do 
not have data available for all variables in the model were excluded.
3.3 Data Analysis
Logit estimation is an empirical technique used to estimate models (i.e. logit 
models) that have a dichotomous dependant variable. Since this study has a 
dichotomous dependant variable (i.e. resignation vs. non-resignation), a logit model 
was developed and estimated. The results were used to explain the occurrence o f 
resignations and to evaluate the association between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable.
3.4 Time-Varying Methodology
In regards to the time-varying nature o f this study, let t represent a 
measurement date o f  the independent variables (variables). In regards to this 
measurement date ( 0  and empirical testing, t was first set equal to the last quarter-end 
date that occurred prior to an event date. The event date for clients whose auditor
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resigned was the actual date the resignation took place as noted in the 8 -K. The event 
date for clients whose auditor did not resign was chosen at random based on the dates 
available during the study period (June 1996 to December 2000). Second, each 
variable was then measured based on quarterly data available at time t. Third, the 
model was estimated and the results regarding the significance o f the variables and 
model were analyzed. Fourth, t was then set equal to the penultimate quarter-end date 
prior to the event date and then the second and third steps previously discussed were 
repeated based on this new t. Stated another way, each variable was be re-measured 
based on a new t, the model was re-estimated and the results were re-analyzed. Fifth, 
the last step (i.e., step four) was be repeated two more times except with different 
quarter-end dates for t. These two dates were the two remaining quarter-end dates o f 
the four most recent quarter-end dates prior to the event date. In summary, the process 
o f  measuring, estimating and analyzing the model was repeated until the results 
associated with data relative to the four most recent quarters prior to the event date had 
been analyzed.
3.S Conclusion
This chapter has presented a discussion o f  the methodology used in this study, 
the research hypotheses, the data sources, and the method o f  testing. Chapter four will 
present the results o f  the tests o f hypothesis.
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CHAPTER IV
Results
The results o f this study are presented in this chapter. Section 4 . 1  describes the 
development o f  the data set. Section 4.2 provides the overall descriptive statistics 
related to the data. Section 4.3 provides the results o f  the statistical analyses.
4.1 Data Set
The structure o f  this subsection is as follows. Section 4.1.1 presents a 
description o f  the databases used in this study. Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 describe the 
process o f  determining a group o f companies in which the auditor resigned 
(resignation group). Section 4.1.4 describes the process o f  determining a group of 
companies in which the auditor did not resign (control group). Sections 4.1.5 and
4.1.6 describe the process o f  gathering data for the full sample (i.e., resignation and 
control group).
4.1.1 Database Description. Compact D/SEC (CDSEC) is a database that 
contains information on companies that file reports with the SEC. In general, 
companies included in this database have at least 500 shareholders o f  one class o f 
stock, have at least S5 million in assets, and have securities listed on a national 
securities exchange or trade securities Over-the-Counter. For each company in the 
database, a variety o f  corporate information is maintained including a list o f the 
specific forms that a company filed with the SEC but not the actual form itself. The 8 -
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K is one form where CDSEC maintains specific filing information for each company, 
namely the date the 8 -K was filed and a numerical code representing the item 
number(s) that are included in the 8 -K (e.g., 4 for item four, see Table 2.1).
4.1.2 Resignation Filinas. Using the 8 -K information contained in each 
quarterly CDSEC disc beginning with the July 1996 disc and ending with the April 
2001 disc, all 8 -Ks that were reported as being filed during the period June 19961 
through December 2000 that included a numerical code o f  four (i.e., indicating that a 
change in auditor had occurred) were selected for further analysis. This selection 
process yielded a total o f  3,652 references to 8 -Ks that potentially contained 
disclosures related to a change in auditor . 2
Based upon an analysis o f  the 3,652 filing references initially selected, those 
that were not related to resignations were excluded as follows (see Table 4.1). First, 
before any attempt was made to locate an 8 -K, the following three exclusions (pre 8 -K 
exclusions) were employed: duplicate filing references (50), filing references o f  
foreign companies (103), and filing references o f  financial companies (536). As a 
result o f  employing the pre 8 -K exclusions (689), 2,963 filing references remained. 
Second, information in each o f  the 2,963 filing references was used to locate and 
examine the 8 -K as stored in the Edgar and/or Lexis/Nexis databases in order to 
determine the type o f auditor change. In this regard, two other exclusions (8 -K search 
exclusions) were employed: 8 -Ks not found (62) and 8 -Ks with no auditor change
' Electronic filings became mandatory for all domestic companies during May 1996. Accordingly, data 
was included in the analysis beginning with June 1996 in order to ensure that all 8-Ks could be accessed 
in the SEC Edgar database or in the Lexis/Nexis database.
2 Since there could be more than one filing per auditor change, the number o f filings doesn’t represent 
the number o f auditor changes during June 1996 through December 2000. Also, 14 filing references for 
forms other than the 8-K (e.g., 10-Q) were found based on an item four code used as part o f the filing 
reference for these forms. These are included in the 3,652 total filing references found.
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disclosure (74). As a result o f  the additional 8 -K search exclusions (136), 2,827 8 -Ks 
remained. Third, while the remaining 8 -Ks all related to an auditor switch, not all o f 
the auditor switches specifically related to resignations. The 8 -Ks not related to a 
resignation were also excluded (non-resignation auditor switch exclusions) as follows: 
dismissals (1,853), declinations (105), and 8 -Ks found but the type o f  switch was not 
specifically stated (143). As a result o f  employing the additional non-resignation 
auditor switch exclusions (2,101), a total o f  726 8 -Ks specifically related to 
resignations remained.
4.1.3 Resignation Group. An analysis o f  the 726 8 -Ks (representing a 
preliminary resignation group) was performed to determine which 8 -Ks should be 
excluded from further analysis. The primary resignation exclusion resulted from 
multiple 8 -Ks that were related to the same auditor change (198). In general, this 
occurred because the successor auditor was not known when the initial 8 -K was filed 
and, subsequently, another 8 -K was filed to disclose this information. There were 
several additional reasons for excluding 8 -Ks from the preliminary resignation group. 
First, 34 observations were excluded because the firm encountered some form o f 
independence problem that motivated them to resign. These problems included 
unpaid fees, a significant business relationship with the company, or litigation related 
to the company. Second, 18 observations were excluded because the firm was no 
longer providing audit services, in general, or the firm was no longer providing audit 
services specifically to public companies. Third, 16 observations were excluded 
because it was unclear whether the change in auditor was a decision made solely by 
the firm or a joint decision by the firm and company. In these cases, the 8 -K disclosed
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TABLE 4.1
______________________ Resignation Group Formation______________________
Total filing references indicating an auditor change: June 1996 to December 2000 3,652
Pre 8-K Search Exclusions:
Duplicate filing references 50
Filing references of foreign companies 103
Filing references o f financial companies 536 689
2,963
8-K Search Exclusions:
8-Ks not found 62
8-Ks with no auditor switch disclosure 74 136
2,827
Non-resignation Auditor Switch Exclusions:
8-Ks related to dismissals 1,853
8-Ks related to declinations 105
8-Ks with auditor switch disclosure but type o f switch not specifically stated 143 2,101
726
Resignation Exclusions:
8-Ks tiled subsequent to the initial resignation disclosure 198
Firm independence issues 34
Firm service issues 18
Decision-maker in resignation not clear 16
Firm changes 16
Engagement problems 8
Company merger 7
Resignation not related to parent company 5
Change in company location 3
One or more o f the reasons above combined 5
Resignation date unknown 1
Multiple resignations less than two years apart 16 327
Resignation Group 399
that either there was a mutual agreement between the company and the firm or that the 
resignation was a result o f negotiations between the company and firm. Fourth, 16 
observations were excluded because the firm underwent structural changes that 
motivated them to resign. These included mergers, the sale o f  an office or an entire 
practice, a relocation o f  the firm, or the dissolution o f  the firm. Fifth, 8  observations
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were excluded because o f  engagement problems encountered with the client. These 
included instances o f  coordination or timing problems, scope limitations and problems 
with other work performed for the company. Sixth, 7 observations were excluded 
because the resignation was linked to a company merger. In general, these 
resignations were due to the desire o f the company to maintain the continuity o f  the 
audit engagement with the firm that audited the other company that was part o f  the 
merger. Seventh, 16 observations (i.e., 8  individual companies) a company had two 
resignations that were two years or less apart. These were excluded due to 
methodological concerns about independence among the observations in the study. 
The remaining reasons (indicated in Table 4.1) for excluding observations are fairly 
self-explanatory and, for convenience, no additional discussion is provided. In sum, 
after all exclusions have been considered, the final resignation group (resignation 
group) consists o f  399 observations.
4 .1 .4 Control Group. A control group was formed using data contained in the 
Compustat database as follows. First, the population o f Compustat companies (21,369 
research and active) was reduced to form a non-resignation group. In this regard, 
companies were excluded if  they met any o f  the following criteria: the company did 
not report any total assets during the study period (i.e., total assets was used as an 
indicator that financial information about the company was available), foreign 
companies, financial companies, non-parent companies (e.g., subsidiaries), or the 
company was included in the resignation group. As a result o f  applying these 
exclusions (13,411), a total o f  7,958 companies remained to form the non-resignation
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group. Second, a random sample o f  400 companies from the non-resignation group 
was extracted to form the control group.
Additionally, a random event date was calculated for each company in the 
control group as follows. First, the number o f  days during the sample period (i.e., 
June 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000) was calculated as 1,675. Second, a random 
number between 0 and 1,674 was chosen for each company. Third, the random 
number was added to the beginning date o f  the study period (i.e., June I, 1996) to 
form the random date.
4 .1 .5 Data Collection. The data used in this study to measure each variable 
was accumulated from four different sources: Edgar, Lexis/Nexis, Compustat, and 
CDSEC. As previously described in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, CDSEC, Edgar and 
Lexis/Nexis were used to determine the set o f  companies in which the auditor resigned 
(i.e., resignation group). Also, section 4.1.4 described how Compustat was used to 
form a set o f  companies that formed the control group. As a result, the dependant 
variable, RESIGN, was set to one for each company in the resignation group and zero 
for each company in the control group.
CDSEC data was used to measure all or part o f  four independent variables. 
First, the TECH variable was set to one if  the SIC code obtained from CDSEC was 
within the ranges o f  SIC codes that prior research has used to denote high-tech 
industries (see section 3.1.1). Second, the calculation o f  the variable used to proxy for 
the independence o f  the auditor (INDEP) required that total revenues for each client 
audited by a  firm, both Big 5 and non-Big 5, be available. CDSEC provided this level 
o f  detail, whereas Compustat does not distinguish between the names o f  the auditors
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of all non-Big 5 firms. Third, the calculation o f  the variable used to measure the level 
o f  mismatch between the auditor and client (LMISM) required that market shares o f  
each firm be calculated based on total audited assets o f  each client. CDSEC provides 
the name o f  each firm as well as the amount o f  total assets whereas, as previously 
stated, Compustat does not. Fourth, one component o f  the variable designed to 
indicate the likelihood o f  future client misrepresentation (MR) was the percentage o f  
officers on the board o f directors (see section 3.1.7). This percentage was calculated 
based on the list o f officers and the list o f directors available for each company in 
CDSEC.
Compustat and Lexis/Nexis were other sources o f data. Compustat was used 
to calculate the variables that proxied for financial distress (LFDB, FDL, FDl), the 
tenure o f  the auditor (TEN), and the size o f the company (SIZE). In addition, 
Compustat was used to calculate the component o f  the client misrepresentation 
variable (MR) that was designed to measure the deficiencies in a company’s free-cash 
flows (FREEC). Lexis/Nexis was used to search for disclosures related to loan 
defaults and errors and/or irregularities as previously discussed in section 3.1.7.
During the data collection process, data for some variables were not available. 
As a result, observations that did not have complete data for all variables for a quarter- 
end date prior to the event date were excluded. Additionally, companies whose audit 
firm maintained a low involvement in their industry were also excluded. A low 
involvement o f  a firm was defined as auditing five or fewer companies in an industry. 
Consequently, the total number o f  observations in the resignation group (399) and the 
control group (400) were reduced based on the additional exclusions. As shown in
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Table 4.2, the resignation (control) group contained a total o f  116 (121) observations 
that had complete data for the first quarter-end date prior to the event date. The total 
number o f observations after all exclusions for the three remaining quarter-end dates is 
also displayed.
4.1.6 Data Transformations. Three variables were transformed in order to 
provide values that would better approximate a linear relationship between the 
variables and the dependant variable used in subsequent model estimation. 
Specifically, the calculation o f  variables FDB, SIZE, and MISM resulted in a range o f 
values within each variable that had a large variation. As a result, it is possible that 
each variable’s effect on the dependant variable might be different at different levels 
o f the variable; hence, the relationship might not be linear in nature. As a result, each 
o f the values in each variable was transformed by calculating the natural logarithm and 
placing the result in a new variable. Thus, the following three variables were formed: 
LFDB, LSIZE, and LMISM.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for each variable in each o f the four time periods 
prior to the event date (e.g., t-i, t.2 , L3 and L4 ) are shown in Table 4.2. In regards to the 
continuous variables, univariate statistics designed to show differences between the 
means o f variables in the resignation and control groups reveal that variables LFDB, 
TEN and LSIZE are significantly different in all four time periods. Specifically, the 
tenure o f  the auditor (TEN) and the size o f the company (LSIZE) were significantly 
lower for the resignation group. Additionally, clients in the resignation group were in 
greater financial distress (LFDB) than companies in the control group. The means o f
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the remaining continuous variables representing the independence o f  the auditor 
(INDEP) and the degree o f  client-firm mismatch (LMISM) were not significantly 
different at the .01 level in any time period. In regards to the dichotomous variables, 
the percent occurrence o f each variable in each group over the four time periods 
reveals that the resignation group had companies that had a greater occurrence o f a net 
loss (FDL) and were more likely to issue misleading financial statements (MR). The 
variable designed to indicate that a sudden loss had occurred (FDI) revealed that only 
a small number o f companies in the sample met this condition. As a result, this 
variable was excluded from further analysis. Additionally, the resignation group, in 
general, contained a slightly greater percentage o f companies that operated in high- 
tech industries (TECH) except for the last period in which the percentage was 
approximately equal. Also, a large percentage o f the companies in both groups were 
audited by a Big 5 firm (BIG5); however, the percentage occurrence o f  a Big 5 auditor 
for companies in the resignation group was slightly lower than that o f the control 
group over all time periods. Finally, the percent occurrence o f  quarter-end dates after 
1998 (LEG98) was slightly greater for the resignation group except for the last time 
period in which the percent occurrence was slightly lower than the control group.
4.3 Results
As a result o f  preliminary analysis, three variables were excluded from the 
model. First, a noted in section 4.2, variable FDI was excluded because o f  the limited 
number companies in either the resignation or control group that met the criteria that 
caused the variable to be set to one. Second, variable INDEP was excluded because o f 
the limited variation in this variable. The standard deviation over all time periods was
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between .001 and .004, and given that the values associated with this variable are 
percents and are constrained by zero and one, the variation in this variable is very 
small. As a result, there is an insufficient variation to accurately measure the intended 
effect associated with this variable. Additionally, the low variation in this variable 
caused many o f  the DFBETAs for this variable to be extremely large and well beyond 
acceptable limits (Neter et al. 1996). Third, variable LFDB was also excluded. LFDB 
was designed to be a more comprehensive continuous measure o f  the financial distress 
o f  a company and therefore provide better fit in the regression models over the simpler 
variable FDL, which is a dichotomous variable set to one if  the company currently has 
a net loss. However, the use o f FDL alone in the models produced a better overall fit. 
Therefore, FDL was used in subsequent model estimations instead o f variable LFDB. 
Based on the exclusion o f the three variables previously mentioned, hypotheses two, 
four, and six (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.4) were not able to be empirically examined 
and thus are not supported.
Table 4.3 presents the results o f estimating the model using a logit regression 
analysis at the four quarter-end dates immediately prior to an event date. The number 
o f  observations is slightly greater than that shown in Table 4.2 because the exclusion 
o f  variables LFDB, FDI and INDEP reduced the number o f  observations that had data 
limitations. Overall, the model is statistically significant at each date in which the 
model was estimated (estimation date). Chi-square statistics for the model ranged 
from 110.4 to 144.3 with associated p-values o f  .000 for all estimation dates. 
Additionally, the likelihood ratio index (i.e., LR = 1 -  log likelihood at 
convergence/log likelihood at zero) was also calculated. The LR (sometimes called
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McFadden’s-R2 statistic) is a psuedo R2 measure that indicates a model’s explanatory 
power. As shown in Table 4.3, the LR index decreases as estimation dates further 
away from the event date are used. Stated another way, using information closer to 
the event date increases the explanatory power o f  the model.
Three variables were statistically insignificant at each estimation date (i.e., 
TECH, LEG98 and BIG5). First, variable TECH was associated with hypothesis one. 
This hypothesis states that clients operating in high technology industries are 
positively related to the probability o f an auditor resignation; however, this was not 
supported. Second, variable LEG98 was associated with hypothesis ten. This 
hypothesis states that the passage o f the SLUSA o f  1998 reduced an auditor’s 
litigation risk and is negatively related to the probability o f  an auditor resignation. 
Results show that this hypothesis was not supported. Third, variable BIG5 was 
associated with hypothesis eleven. This hypothesis states that the size o f  the firm (i.e., 
Big 5) that audits a company is positively related to the probability o f  a resignation. 
This hypothesis was not supported.
Variables FDL, TEN and LSIZE were statistically significant at each 
estimation date and the signs o f  the coefficients were consistent with the associated 
hypotheses. Therefore, it appears that resignations are more likely to occur when 
companies are in financial distress (FDL), when the tenure o f  the auditor is low 
(TEN), and when the size o f  the client is small (LSIZE). Thus, hypotheses three, five, 
and seven (respectively) are supported.
The likelihood o f misrepresentations on the part o f  management was modeled 
by variable MR. This variable was statistically significant with the expected sign only
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TABLE 4.3 
Results*
Coefficient 
Marginal Effectb
Variable (t-value)
Coefficient 
Marginal Effect 
(t-value)
Coefficient 
Marginal Effect 
(t-value)
Coefficient 
Marginal Effect 
(t-value)
Constant 3.144* 3.074 * 3.899 * 3.805 *
.786 .765 .972 .948
(2.564) (2.655) (3.414) (3.573)
TECH -.678 -.331 -.456 -.682
-.169 -.082 -.114 -.170
(-1.492) (-.749) (-1.122) (-1.690)
FDL .963 ** .945* .872** 1.077*
.241 .235 .217 .268
(2.439) (2.584) (2.420) (3.074)
TEN -.126* -.129 * -.152 * -.169*
-.031 -.032 -.038 -.042
(-3.049) (-3.264) (-3.789) (-4.317)
LSIZE -.469 * -.478 * -.511 * -.419*
-.117 -.119 -.127 -.104
(-4.150) (-4.348) (-4.675) (-4.118)
LMISM -.333 * -.300 * -.379 ** -.388 **
-.083 -.075 -.094 -.097
(-2.308) (-2.160) (-2.715) (-2.961)
MR 1.629 * 1.629 * .654 .413
.407 .405 .163 .103
(4.008) (4.017) (1.632) (1-101)
LEG98 .032 .444 .516 .051
.008 -.110 .129 .013
(.088) (1.201) (1-423) (134)
BIG5 -.791 -.806 -.740 -.809
-.198 -.201 -.184 -.202
(-.800) (-.838) (-.799) (-934)
N 243 259 250 248
Chi-square 133.7* 144.3 * 119.6* 110.4 *
LR index0 .40 .40 .35 .32
Classification rate1 81.1% 83.4% 78.4% 77.4%
'  Results reported for a logit regression analysts estimated at four quarter-end dates immediately prior to an event date t and 
are denoted by t , where x = 1. 2, 3. 4. Variables in the model are as follows. RESIGN = 1 for companies whose auditor 
resigned. TECH = 1 if a company’s SIC code is in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, or between 3825 and 3839 FDL = 1 if a 
company has a net loss based on the four quarters immediately prior to and including t ,. TEN is the tenure of the auditor in 
years. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at t L.MISM is the natural logarithm of a measure designed to capture 
the degree of mismatch between a client and their auditor. MR = 1 if there is a greater likelihood of misrepresentation on the 
part of management. LEG98 = I if the year at i , is greater than 1998. BIG5 = 1 if a company is audited by a Big 5 firm.
“ Marginal effects are calculated as the partial derivatives of the expected probability o f a resignation conditioned on the 
vector of independent variables evaluated at each variable’s mean. 
c LR index is the log likelihood ratio index computed as 1 -  log likelihood at convergence/log likelihood at zero. 
d Classification rate is based on models ability to classify both resignations and non-resignations.
Significant at the .01 level.
** Significant at the .05 level. _____________________ __________________________________________________________
for the two quarter-end dates immediately preceding the event date (i.e., Li and t-2), 
thus lending support to hypothesis nine. This suggests that the impact o f  the
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disclosure o f  information that indicates a greater likelihood o f  misrepresentation on 
the part o f  management on a firm’s decision to resign is sensitive to time. 
Specifically, recall that MR was based on the disclosure o f such information within 12 
months prior to each estimation date (see section 3.1.7) and that the results that 
showed that this variable was statistically significant only for the two estimation dates 
immediately preceding the event date (see Table 4.3).
Variable LMISM was designed to measure the degree o f  client-firm mismatch, 
and as proposed in hypothesis eight, this variable had a predicted positive relationship 
to the probability o f  an auditor resignation. Results show that this variable was 
significant at each estimate date; however, the sign is opposite to that proposed. A 
possible explanation o f  this result is that in the context o f  resignations the variable is 
measuring a different motivation associated with a firm’s evaluation o f  their client 
portfolios than that proposed. Specifically, recall that LMISM is based on the theory 
that a decrease in a firm’s market share and/or a relatively low market share compared 
to the market share o f  the firm with the highest market share is associated with an 
increased likelihood o f a client-firm mismatch and an increased likelihood o f a 
resignation (see section 3.1.6). However, based on the results, it is possible that the 
use o f  firm market shares in this context indicates that firms that have an increase in 
their market share and/or a relatively high market share (i.e., a low LMISM) may re­
evaluate their client portfolio and choose to resign from those engagements that are 
more risky and/or less profitable. Conversely, firms that have a decrease in market 
share and/or a relatively low market share (i.e., a high LMISM) may be less likely to
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resign in order to maintain the current and future profitability associated with their 
clients.
In addition to the results presented above, the marginal effects o f  each variable 
are also given in Table 4.3. These represent the partial derivatives o f  the expected 
probability o f  a resignation conditioned on the vector o f  independent variables 
evaluated at the mean o f  each variable. While using the mean for continuous 
independent variables in these calculations is intuitive, using the mean o f  dichotomous 
independent variables is not; however, the marginal effect o f  dichotomous variables 
evaluated at their mean does provide a reasonable approximation to the change in the 
probability o f  the dependant variable given that sample sizes are large (Greene 2000).
Based on the marginal effects in Table 4.3, it appears that certain statistically 
significant independent variables play a larger role in the resignation decision than 
others. Specifically, the largest impact on the decision to resign is produced by 
variable MR. In this case, factors that may lead a firm to suspect potential 
misrepresentations by management increase the probability that an auditor will resign 
by approximately 41% on average over the first two estimation dates (i.e., L| and Li). 
However, as previously stated above, this effect is sensitive to time. The next variable 
that has the most influential marginal effect is FDL. Based on its marginal effect, 
companies that have a net loss increase the likelihood that their auditor will resign by 
approximately 24% on average over all estimation dates. LSIZE is another variable 
whose marginal effect is presented; however, since this variable is based on the natural 
logarithm o f total assets, its interpretation is somewhat obscured by the 
transformation. Still, an interpretation based on the transformation does provided
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some information. Therefore, based on the results, a one unit increase in LSIZE 
decreases the likelihood o f  a resignation by 11.7% on average over all estimation 
dates. The remaining two variables have a smaller impact on the probability o f  a 
resignation relatively speaking. Based on the results for TEN, each additional year o f 
an audit engagement reduces the likelihood o f a resignation between 3% and 4%, and 
based on the results for LMISM, a one unit increase in this variable reduces the 
likelihood o f  a resignation by approximately 8.7% on average.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusions
The structure o f  this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 provides a summary o f 
the study. Section 5.2 provides the implications that relate to the results o f the study. 
Section 5.3 provides a summary o f  the limitations and possible extensions o f the 
study.
5.1 Summary
There were two main objectives o f this study (see section 1.2). The first 
objective was to develop a theoretical model that will explain auditor resignations. To 
meet this objective, a model was developed which was prim arily grounded in prior 
research related to auditor resignations as well as prior research addressing auditor 
switching. In this regard, the following variables were included in the model: the 
industry in which the client operates (specifically, high-tech industries), the client’s 
financial distress as measured by the presence o f a net loss, the tenure o f  the auditor, 
the level o f  independence o f  the auditor, the size o f  the client, the likelihood o f 
misrepresentations on the part o f  management and the size o f  the auditor (specifically, 
Big 5 firms).
Additionally, two other variables, each representing derivations from variables 
employed in prior research related to auditor resignations and/or prior research related
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
to auditor switching, were also included in the model. Specifically, a variable that 
measured the financial distress o f  the client in a more comprehensive fashion by 
utilizing a bankruptcy prediction model was included as well as a variable that 
measured the level o f  client-firm mismatch based on changes in firm’s market shares. 
Finally, two other variables, not included in the literature to date regarding auditor 
resignations and auditor switching, were also included in the model. Specifically, a 
variable was included to model the impact o f  the changes in the legal environment 
(specifically, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act o f 1998) as well as a 
variable to model a current net loss that follows two periods o f  net income (sudden net 
loss).
The second objective was to estimate the model at several different quarterly 
dates immediately prior to an event date so that the effects o f time on the explanatory 
power o f the model and each independent variable could be ascertained. This 
objective was met by identifying and collecting data for each variable in the model for 
a sample o f  companies and by using a regression technique to estimate the model. In 
regards to identifying and collecting data, the first step performed was to use the 
Compact D/SEC (CDSEC) database to identify the resignations that took place from 
June, 1996 to December, 2000. The result o f  this process was a resignation group o f 
companies in which the event date was the actual date o f  the resignation. Second, the 
Compustat database was used to form a control group o f companies, and an event date 
was assigned to each company by selecting a date at random from all the possible 
dates during the sample period. Third, data for companies in both the resignation and 
control groups were obtained from Compustat, CDSEC, and/or Lexis/Nexis.
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In regards to estimating the model, a logit regression technique was employed. 
As a result o f  preliminary analysis, three variables were excluded from the model. 
First, the variable designed to measure a client's financial distress by utilizing a 
bankruptcy model (FDB) was excluded because the financial distress measure based 
on the presence o f  a net loss provided a better overall fit in the model. Second, the 
variable designed to measure a sudden net loss (FDI) was excluded because o f the 
limited number o f  companies that met this condition. Third, the variable designed to 
measure the independence o f  the auditor (INDEP) was excluded because the variation 
o f  this variable was not sufficient to measure its effect in the model.
Overall results from estimating the model suggest that the model was 
significant for each o f  the four quarterly time periods and that using information closer 
to the event date increased the model’s explanatory power. In regards to the specific 
independent variables, the results suggest that, for all quarterly time periods, firms are 
more likely to resign from (1) clients who are smaller in size (LSIZE); (2) clients who 
are in financial distress as modeled by a net loss (FDL); (3) engagements in which the 
tenure o f  the auditor is low (TEN); and (4) clients who are in industries in which the 
auditor has an increasing and/or a relatively high market share (LMISM). 
Additionally, companies that had a greater likelihood o f management 
misrepresentation (MR) were also associated with an increase in the likelihood o f a 
resignation; however, this association was sensitive to time. Specifically, this 
association was only significant in the two quarterly time periods immediately prior to 
the event date. Finally, the following variables were not significant at any estimation 
date: (I )  changes in the litigation environment (LEG98); (2) clients in high-tech
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industries (TECH); and, (3) clients audited by larger firms (BIG5). Thus, the results 
suggest that these variables were not an important part o f  a firm’s decision to resign.
5.2 Implications
As previously indicated, the results suggest that firms were more likely to 
resign from clients who currently had a net loss. Given that a net loss is a proxy for 
financial distress, this result is consistent with prior resignation research (Shu 2000). 
The results also suggest, consistent with prior resignation research, that firms were 
more likely to resign from clients who had a greater likelihood o f  misrepresentation on 
the part o f management (Menon and Williams 1999). These results suggest that firms 
do respond to variables related to the client that may indicate a greater degree o f audit 
risk and (such firms) are not solely fixed on generating audit fees at the expense o f 
external parties to the client.
Additionally, the results, which are consistent with prior resignation research, 
suggest that firms were also more likely to resign from clients in situations where 
auditor tenure was low (Menon and Williams 1999). This may indicate that, as firms 
become increasingly knowledgeable o f  the negative attributes o f  their client relatively 
soon after the client acceptance decision (e.g., significant weaknesses in internal 
controls not known at the time o f the client acceptance decision), such firms may 
respond by resigning. If this is true, then this also suggests, as previously mentioned, 
that firms do respond to increases in audit risk by resigning and are not solely fixed on 
generating audit fees.
Further, the results suggest, consistent with prior resignation research, that 
firms are more likely to resign from smaller clients (Menon & W illiams 1999). This
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may suggest a bias (to some degree) on the part o f  firms toward those clients that 
generate larger fees for the firm. It also appears that as firms gain market share in an 
industry, this allows them to be more selective o f  the clients that they keep, perhaps 
resigning from those engagements that are less profitable and/or more risky.
Finally, the results suggest two additional implications. First, the enactment o f  
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act o f  1998 (SLUSA) did not change the 
overall litigation risk faced by firms such that they would alter their decision making 
regarding resignations. It is possible that firms may require that the SLUSA be tested 
in actual court cases before they will perceive a reduction in litigation risk. Second, 
differences in the resignation decision criteria between Big 5 and non-Big 5 firms may 
not be as substantial as expected. However, significant differences may exist in these 
criteria among the Big 5 (non-Big 5) firms, but they may offset each other when the 
Big 5 (non-Big 5) firms, as in this study, are considered as a group.
S.3 Limitations and Extensions
The findings o f this study may be limited in generalizability given that (1) the 
sample period corresponded with a period o f  relative economic prosperity and (2) the 
sample was limited to publicly traded companies. Accordingly, additional insights 
regarding resignations may be obtained from future research in which (1) the sample 
period corresponds with a period o f economic uncertainty and/or (2) the sample 
includes privately held companies. Admittedly, a firm’s decision to resign may be 
based on client or firm factors not yet addressed in the literature. Accordingly, future 
research regarding the nature o f  such factors could provide additional insights 
regarding resignations.
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Proxies were used to indirectly measure several factors (i.e., independent 
variables) in this study. In this regard, future research could rely on direct measures o f 
such factors as additional information becomes available. For example, effective 
February 5, 2001, the SEC modified the reporting requirements on proxy statements 
such that the following information must be disclosed: aggregate audit fees, aggregate 
fees for financial information systems design and implementation, and aggregate fees 
for non-audit services. As a result, data related to one or more o f these types o f  fees 
could be used to directly measure audit fees (versus, as in this study, the use o f  client 
revenues as a proxy for audit fees).
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